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This paper presents the importance, the state of affairs and the development strategies of 
the state-owned enterprises in the Fishery sector of Vietnam. The purpose is, firstly, to 
review state-owned enterprise reform literature of relevance to Vietnam. Secondly, the 
reform of state-owed enterprises in Vietnam particularly in the Fisheries Sector is 
reviewed to determine the important issues and problems as well as the its role in the 
renovation process of Vietnamese fisheries state-sector enterprises. Finally, the 
opportunities, conditions, and obstacles for the reform are identified in the sector 
economic development. The review of the state-owned enterprise reform in Vietnam 
suggests that the diversification of ownership is one of the most important factors 
affecting successes of the economic reform. There is a need for accelerating equitisation 
of state-owned enterprises to have more involvement of private sectors. In the Fisheries 
sector, inefficient operations of fisheries state-owned enterprises have imposed financial 
burden on the national budget. Data of financial performance of fisheries enterprises 
including state general corporations and equitised companies is employed to observe 
changes of their profitability, operating efficiency, and leverages. Nonetheless, restricted 
accessibility of records of state-owned enterprise financial performance caused some 
limitations of analysis of financial and economic performances. The empirical result 
shows that equitised companies have been operating much more efficiently than pre-
equitisation. The state capitals are being invested with higher returns and more 
significantly, budgetary burden was removed. Some obstacles such as incomplete and 
irrelevant regulations and lack of broad-based consensus of equitisation have accounted 
for lags of the reform process. It is necessary to create a more effective policy and legal 
frameworks, more incentives for actors participating in the process and more stable 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is organised in eight sections. The thesis begins with the introduction section 
associated with the global problem of privatisation, the rationale and the purpose of this 
study. Section 2 is about methodology. Literature of state-owned enterprises and 
privatisation theory is reviewed in section 3. Next, section 4 reviews the state-owned 
enterprise reform in Vietnam since the economic renovation progress “Doi Moi”. Section 
5 is the review of state-owned enterprise reform in Fisheries sector, analysis of 
equitisation effects on state-owned enterprises, issues and possible solutions, and 
development strategies for the reform progress. Section 5 is followed by conclusion and 
recommendation section. Finally, the thesis ends up with references and appendices as 
section 7 and 8.   
1. Problem of SOE reform in transitional economies 
The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been taking place all over the world, in 
developed, developing and transitional countries. It happened first in developed countries 
such as the United Kingdom, the United Stated or Japan known as privatisation for the 
reason of SOEs were inefficiently operating.  
The collapse of centrally planned economies caused transitions to market economies of 
many countries such as Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria …in Eastern and Central Europe,  
China and Vietnam in Asia. The financial and operating performance of SOEs in these 
countries remained generally poor or actually worsened. The financial burden imposed on 
strained government by loss-making SOEs overwhelmed the national budget and banking 
system (Nellis, 2002). Privatisation of SOEs in many sectors of the national economy 
offered introductions of new management mechanism and new ownership structure to 
SOEs. It comes from the widespread consensus that the gain of more dynamic economic 
growth requires a greater role of private sector and market forces (UNCTAD, 1995). 
Different countries have different expectations for privatisation taking place in each 
national economy but they have some common objectives. These objectives are to 
promote economic efficiency by promoting competition, to redefine the role of the state 
in the movement of the economy, to reduce the financial burden of loss-making SOEs, to 
release limited state resources for financing other demands, to mobilise foreign 
investment and domestic resources for development, and to spread share ownership 
(UNCTAD, 1995). 
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The design of privatisation comprising transforming properties rights, creating new 
corporate governance mechanism, building the institutions of a private market economy 
should take into account the interests of and distribution of power among stakeholders 
that are various from one to another countries (Gray, 1996). 
There are some factors critical to the success of privatisation including ownership rights, 
macroeconomic conditions, administrative capacity, and the quality of the national private 
sectors (OECD, 1995 and Guislain, 1997).  
2. The importance of the SOE reform 
The current wave of privatisation follows a long period of nationalisation and growth of 
the size of state sector in the economy. The nationalisation happened practically in every 
economic area of economic activity and in many countries just like privatisation’s taking 
place. In many countries, the development strategy has been largely based on state-owned 
enterprises until recent disappointing performance of SOEs (Guislain, 1997). SOEs 
contribute to eliminate the shortcomings of the private sector and lead the development of 
the national economy. SOEs often serve political objectives or purposes and hence suffer 
frequently intervention by government and bureaucrats. Although many SOEs function 
well but many others notoriously inefficiency. They managed to survival by tax 
protection against competing import, preferences in public procurement, exceptional 
rights, preferential access to credit, tax exemption, government guarantees, and state 
subsidies. Almost everywhere, the burden SOEs impose on state finances has become 
untenable. 
Some empirical studies conclude that efficiency of an enterprise is determined not so 
much by its public or private characteristic but others find that private ownership leads to 
greater productivity. Some reforms designed to give SOEs more autonomy and expose 
them to free competition without changing to private ownership have produce encourage 
results. Nevertheless, many governments, today, consider privatisation as the crucial 
means to sustain this improvement. In addition, most government facing budget deficits 
and financial crises no longer have financial resources to compensate losses of SOEs and 
provide capital increases for development. By privatisation, the state can reduce public 
debts and fiscal burden of loss-making SOEs and free limited funds for financing other 
activities. Apart from this, privatisation attracts new investment particularly foreign 
investment, together with new technology and management skills, as well as new partners 
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for enterprise growth. To solve the problem of limited state resources, privatisation can 
also mobilise more domestic resources for development. 
In Vietnamese economy, the state sector, SOE in particular, has dominant role for 
production capacity and major state sources of revenue and employment. The reform of 
SOEs including partial or full equitation of non-essential SOEs, dissolution of non 
performing SOEs, introductions of new management system that is more responsive to 
market forces, and grant of greater autonomy to SOEs by redefining ownership structure 
and reducing state interference will contribute to the economic development.  
3. The research problems 
Since 1980s, Vietnam has been carrying out the economic renovation process 
transforming the national economy from centrally planning to market-oriented. The 
approaches are diversifying the ownership of SOEs, promoting competition to improve 
the efficiency and performance of SOE sector. The Fisheries sector was the pioneer in the 
SOE reform by its application of new economic management mechanism to overcome the 
problems of long time loss-making. Recently, fisheries SOEs have been restructured to 
improve the efficiency and operating performance. However, there are still many 
problems and difficulties hindering the reform progress. It is necessary to define 
measures and attempts to accelerate and make it successful. 
Therefore, this study focuses the research questions as the following: 
• What is the current situation of the SOE reform in the Fisheries sector of 
Vietnam? 
• How important is the SOE reform in the fishery economic renovation? 
• To what extent could the SOE reform be a major motivation for development 
of state sector? 
4. Summary of theoretical issues and practical background 
4.1. Theoretical issues and practical background 
This study provides better understanding of the reform of state-owned enterprises in 
Vietnam and particularly in the Fisheries sector in recent years. There are a number of 
studies on the SOE reform in Vietnam with main focuses in some industries, for instance 
infrastructure or telecommunication but not in Fisheries sector. Therefore, this study will 
be the one of the reports about the reform of state sector economics of Fisheries and it 
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may contribute to considerations for major issues and possible solutions to speed up the 
renovation progress. Because of poor performance SOEs annually cause financial deficits 
to the national budget and operate with low efficiency as well as weak competitiveness. 
Commercial principles and objectives have been introduced to SOEs in many manners 
such as restructuring, commercialisation, or divestitures. The transition of the national 
economy from long period of centrally planning to market-oriented development requires 
considerably changes in policy, institutional and legal frameworks.  
The reform of SOE in the Fisheries sector has been carrying out for years but not yet 
achieved remarkable results. There are many SOEs still making losses or operating 
inefficiently. They are facing increasing competition from non-state sector enterprises. It 
is necessary to make private capital and private management culture involve in fisheries 
SOEs by transferring them to joint-stock and state-owned limited liability companies. 
This also promotes the ownership diversification and strengthens competitive capacity of 
these enterprises. Until 2002, the SOE reform was undertaken with only a small number 
of fisheries SOEs. However, the government has initially gained some certain successes 
in defining the role of the state sector and promoting investment of private capitals.  
4.2. Usefulness of potential applications of the research’s findings 
As mentioned above, loss-making fisheries SOEs is a significant financial burden to the 
state. The only way to improve this state of affairs is to introduce more efficient 
management mechanism and to expose them to free competition. The government has 
had many attempts to remove political obstacles as well as institutional and legal 
deficiencies causing sluggishness of the SOE reform. By reviewing previously empirical 
studies and experiences in privatisation and analysis of current state of fisheries SOEs, 
this study is trying to search for major issues and potential solutions to accelerate the 
processes. Hence the research probably provides some findings to the contribution of the 
economic renovation in Fisheries sector as follows: 
• Major problems of and potential solutions to the SOE reform process 
• Experiences for further equitisation of fisheries SOEs  
• Possible measures to advance the SOE reform process  
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5. Purposes of the research 
The reform of SOE system in Vietnam toward the market forces has reduced the number 
of SOEs and strengthened every aspect of their performance. This is an essential stage of 
the transition to the market economy of the nation. Many economic development policies 
and measures have been introduced to improve the efficiency of the state economic 
sector. In the Fisheries sector, SOEs have been in loss-making and poor performance for  
long time causing deficits for the national budget and the loss of the state sector leading 
role. Throughout the restructuring of fisheries SOEs, the economic efficiency and 
competitiveness of SOEs were improved considerably. More state resources would be 
freed for other investment demands and the mobilisation of private capitals would 
actively involve in business. Therefore, the economic efficiency, welfare and growth of 
the whole Fisheries sector would also be enhanced. On the other hand, there have been 
some issues concerning legal and institutional frameworks, property rights, 
macroeconomic policies, and enforcement system. 
The main objectives of the research are to: 
• Review literature of the SOE reform of relevance to Vietnam; 
• Review of the SOE reform in Vietnam and in the Fisheries sector particularly; 
• Analyse the importance of the SOE reform in the economic renovation 
• Identify the opportunities, conditions and obstacles for the SOE reform in the 
sector economic development  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Problem of the SOE reform in global context 
1.1. The collapse of centrally planned economies  
Centrally planned socialist economy is characterised by chronic shortages, excess 
demand and repressed inflation, different motivation and social relationship between 
enterprises, the state and manager, the state and worker, and buyer and seller (Gehrke and 
Knell, 1992), and by political inspired decision making and direct control of investment 
(Rider, 1992). This resulted in sluggish growth, lack of incentive to innovate and wide 
spread product deterioration (Gehrke and Knell, 1992), as well as low standards of living 
and mediocre consumption (Lavigne, 1995).  
It is commonly held belief that the crisis behind the collapse of centrally planned 
economies is the inherent in the institution of centrally planning and social ownership of 
the means of productions (Rider and Knell, 1992). The planning is mandatory and not 
indicative. The decision-maker is political authorities (Lavigne, 1995). The asset did not 
belong to the state nor the workers but they were the property of the nation as a whole 
(Bottomore, 1990). This concept of “social ownership” was never clearly specified 
(Lavigne, 1995). 
There had been previous attempts to improve economic efficiency in 1950s and the 
reforms in 1980s have attracted more attention due to the problems of centrally planned 
economy still existed and called for new approach. There has also been a willingness of 
consideration for new ownership forms of productive resources (Rider, 1992). The reform 
is intended to overcome deficiencies by decentralisation of economic decision-making so 
that the managers and workers in individual enterprises have greater independence and 
responsibility, and also more incentives to produce more efficiently. The importance is 
not the question of ownership or promotion of competition but the decentralisation of 
economic decision-making (Bottomore, 1990).  
The dissolution of COMECON and Warsaw Pact organisation in the middle of 1991 
marked the collapse of centrally planning economies. 
1.2. The global trends of privatisation 
Latin America and Caribbean. 
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The Latin America and Caribbean region was the strongest privatiser among all regions 
in term of sale volume (Sader, 1995). About 58% of all privatisation revenues in the 
developing world were sold in this region during the period of 1988 – 1993. Sales 
reached at the peak in 1991 and then declined as a sign of the fact that several large Latin 
nations had already sold most of their state-owned assets (Sader, 1995). 
Europe and Central Asia 
The former centrally planned of Eastern Europe and former Central Asian republics of 
the Soviet Union have privatised massive proportions of state owned assets. Between 
1989 (when Hungary first began the privatisation process) and 1993, these countries sold 
more than 1,000 enterprises, representing almost half of all privatisation transactions in 
the developing world (excluding voucher privatisations) (Sader, 1995; World Bank, 
1995; and Ramamurti, 1999). Hungary turned out to be the most active privatiser in the 
region that focused on revenue generation rather than on mass privatisation through 
vouchers despite political difficulties. Following Hungary was the former Czechoslovakia 
and Poland (Sader, 1995). 
East Asia and the Pacific 
The most intensive privatisers in term of revenues from sales were Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and China (Sader, 1995; Ramamurti, 1999). The government of China does 
not officially use the word " privatisation”, but in practice has reduced state ownership by 
offering shares to domestic and foreign investors on the Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Hong 
Kong stock exchanges. 
South Asia 
The privatisation in South Asia has been declining since the early of 1990s. India was 
dominant in term of privatisation program. Pakistan and Sri Lanca have been declining 
the privatisation process since the earlier ignitions.  
North Africa and the Middle East 
Privatisation in North Africa and the Middle East was minor in terms of value and 
number of transactions but have been growing rapidly since 1993 (Sader, 1995; World 
Bank, 1995). 
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2. State-owned enterprise and privatisation 
2.1. Concept of the state-owned enterprise 
There are many possible definitions of what constitutes a state-owned enterprise. The 
“state-owned enterprise” has common meaning of a company being partly or fully owned 
by the government and legitimated to operate in any sectors of the economy, and 
providing public services or goods for the society. The term “state-owned enterprise” is 
also used interchangeably with the terms “public enterprise” and “state enterprise”. 
Nevertheless, in many economists’ points of view, the concept of the SOE is narrower 
than that of public enterprise. In some literature, the SOE is defined as one kind of public 
enterprise. For convenience, the term public enterprise in this research is considered as a 
synonym of the term state-owned enterprise. 
Bös (1986) divides public enterprise into several legal or corporate forms but only public 
corporations and state companies are in questions of this research. He defines that “state 
companies are private law institutions, establish under the ordinary company law, which 
are controlled by the government by virtue of its ownership of the shares, whether wholly 
or in part.” The minimum proportion of total shares considered as sufficient control for 
the enterprise is to be a state enterprise varies from one country to another and across 
international classifications. And then, “public corporations are institutions of public law 
with a separate legal personality, usually created by a specific law or decree which 
defines the corporation’s powers and duties”. Public corporations mode of financing is by 
loans or by capital allocations and not by issuing the shares or stocks. 
Ramanadham (1991) defines the concept of public enterprise as “an organisation in 
which the majority ownership and/or control is non-private, and which is intended to be 
viable though the sales activity on the basis of price-cost relationship”. The ownership 
criterion is the one of the most concerned aspect of the definition be cause it decides, in 
most cases, the public decision. In the case that government or public agencies together 
owns 100% or majority ownership (i.e. above 50%), the government will take full powers 
to public decision by influencing the board. Otherwise the government does not enjoy the 
significant decisional powers that is may be wrong in practice.  
World Bank (1995) defines SOE as government owned or government controlled 
economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling goodies and 
services. The definition limits the enterprise to commercial activities in which the 
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government controls management by virtue of its ownership stake. It encompasses 
enterprises directly operated by a government department or those in which the 
government holds a majority of the shares, if the distribution of the remaining shares 
leaves the government with effective control. 
Guislain (1997) defines the public enterprise as an enterprise owned by the public sector, 
including the state, municipalities, other SOEs, or other public bodies. However, this term 
includes enterprises organised as governmental entities, public agencies, and companies 
so that it is broader than the term of state-owned enterprise. 
The State-Owned Enterprise Law of Vietnam (1995) defines a state-owned enterprise as 
“an economic organisation which is capitalised, set up, organised and managed by the 
State and carries out business or public-utility operations, aimed at achieving the socio-
economic objectives assigned by the State”. 
2.2. The role of the SOEs in the economy 
There is a broad difference of the ways the SOEs came in to be in developed and 
developing countries. In developed countries, they were mainly the result of the 
nationalisation of industries or enterprises that existed, in the United Kingdom, France or 
Austria as examples (Ramanadham, 1991). Most of SOEs in developing countries have 
been products of governmental sponsoring or creation for the first time. Nationalisation 
became secondary significance. 
SOEs have been playing important roles in the economic development of a nation. 
Ramanadham (1986) pointed out that the SOEs are operating to define the plan strategy 
and social gain. In some economies, the private sector did not come forward sufficiently 
so that the state sector has come in and expanded as necessary for the development.  In 
many countries, SOEs were considered as the aid to private entrepreneurs. They are there 
with the aim to develop private enterprises by leading the way, providing investor 
confidence and sharing risks thought out joint-ventures. One of the most significant roles 
of SOEs is that they could enable the government to control over the economy. The SOE 
also has the roles of ownership de-concentration, anti-monopoly and probably social 
restructuring. 
2.3. Concept of privatisation 
A very broad term, but most simply, privatisation is the transfer of assets or service 
delivery from the government to the private sector. Privatisation runs a very broad range, 
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sometimes leaving very little government involvement, and other times creating 
partnerships between government and private service providers where government is still 
the dominant player.  
The term privatisation has generally been defined as any process aimed at shifting 
functions and responsibilities, in whole or in part, from the government to the private 
sector (definition set forth by the US General Accounting Office).  
The Thai Office of State Enterprise and Government Securities (2000) defined the 
definition of the term privatisation in its Master Plan for Reform of SOE Sector: 
"Privatisation is here defined as all measures, which increase private sector participation 
in sectors where government enterprises presently operate. It includes divestiture of state-
owned enterprises or assets (ownership transfer), concession arrangements, joint-
ventures, management contracts, leasing, outsourcing, contracting of services, 
deregulation which increases competition, creation of needed regulatory bodies, and 
introduction of new competitors." 
The term “equitisation” is used in Vietnam interchangeably with the term “privatisation” 
for some political reasons and there is no exact definition of equitisation. This term can 
be interpreted that it is the transformation process of a SOE into a joint-stock company by 
selling the whole or part of state assets to non-state parties. In these joint-stock 
companies, the state may or may not be the dominant shareholder controlling more than a 
half of total issued shares (Ngo Quang Minh et al, 2001). 
The International Finance Corporation – IFC, World Bank (1995) has been, in generous 
stance, defined that privatisation is any transfer of ownership or control from public to 
private sector. It also figured out more precisely that the definition of the term 
privatisation requires that the transfer be enough to give the private operators or owners 
substantive independent power. This will not always imply majority ownership. Transfer 
techniques can be trade sales to a strategic investor, public offer, closed subscription, 
joint-venture, liquidation, concessions, auctions, voucher or certificate based transfers, 
employee or management buyouts or most combinations of all of these.  
Guislain (1997) pointed out that the term “privatisation” could have several different 
meanings at certain levels. At one level, this term implies the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises through any techniques. Privatisation, in narrow sense, means permanent 
transfer of control from a public agency to one or more private parties not considering the 
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results of the transfer of ownership right that the public sector shareholders have to give 
up. In a broader sense, the term “privatisation”, at enterprise level, consists of any 
measure that results in transfer of activities held by public agency to private sector.  
At another level, sector privatisation, the term “privatisation” has introduced the entry of 
private sector, usually by get rid of public monopolies or any bans set up to entry.  This 
often, but not obligatorily comprises privatisation at enterprise level and brings the 
introduction of real competition among market operators. At a third level, the term 
privatisation have even broader meaning not just only of enterprises or sectors but of an 
entire economy. However the degree of the privatisation of a given economy depends on 
the scope of the reform programme and the state ownership and control. Although, at 
these levels, the term privatisation has differences, there is no meaning that those are 
sealed off from each other but close interactions exist among them. 
3. Property right issues 
The transition from centrally planned to market-oriented economy requires many aspects 
of changing and introducing. Of these ownership changes, preferably to private 
ownership, in a large share of the economy is important. Once the market is liberalisation, 
the government cannot indefinitely control the large parts of a dynamic, changing 
economy. Decentralising ownership is the best way to increase competition and improve 
performance (World Bank, 1996). Property right is the back borne of a market economy 
and usually protected by country’s constitution or constitutional tradition. In case that the 
constitutions or legal systems do not recognise the rights of private ownership it is 
necessary to amend them to allow privatisation to take place (Guislain, 1997). 
There have been some reasons for the state ownership. The state is responsible for co-
ordinating all overall socio-economics objectives. The government is controlling high-
income sectors or industries that consumers are willing to purchase products or services 
with any prices. The government also has responsible for ensuring the fairness between 
the nation’s citizens particularly who live in remote areas or with difficulties (Begg, 
Fischer and Dornbusch, 2000). 
The private ownership rights encompass a certain number of legally recognised rights, 
particularly the rights to use and control the assets, to draw economic benefits from the 
ownership, to dispose of these assets and to transfer any of the above rights. These rights 
may be restricted by law but not to the point that they are meaningless (Naya, 1990; 
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Guislain, 1997). The private enterprise may be more entrepreneurial and it may be easier 
for manager of private firm to define what products or production processes will be 
successful while the SOE is more susceptible to pressure of interest groups (Gylfason et 
al, 2001). The owners of private enterprise have strong incentives to make sure that their 
resources are used in the most efficient manner to achieve maximum return on their 
investments (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or, in other words, solely focus on maximising 
profits (Gylfason et al, 2001). 
To make privatisation successful, Guislain (1997) poses some key questions concerning 
the private ownership rights must be answered clearly. How ownership are defined in the 
country; How the private ownership is recognised and protected; what restrictions, if any, 
are placed on the transfers of those rights; how the titling, registration and cadastre 
mechanisms function; what enforcement mechanisms exist to protect the rights of 
individuals, particularly how effective the judicial system is; and what restrictions may be 
placed on foreigners with respect to the acquisition and exercise of ownership right for 
certain types of property.  
4. Reform options 
4.1. Non-divestiture option 
4.1.1. Continuation of state-owned enterprises  
Ramanadham (1991) considered that any SOEs that remain under government ownership 
should be under this head. These SOEs were classified as several categories. (i) SOEs are 
selected for divestiture but still waiting, for example, for a private sector model in which 
the manager shall be given autonomy to make input and output decisions. (ii) SOEs 
deserve to be transferred to the private sector but for any reasons they are not. The 
enterprises have little competitive advantage of staying in public sector but their transfer 
to private sector faces problems other than economic efficiency. (iii) SOEs whose 
monopoly and public-utility characteristics are making them private monopoly that is not 
the privatisation priority such as in electricity or water supplies. These enterprises require 
the necessary regulations in the case that they are monopolies regardless these enterprises 
are under state or private ownership. (iv) SOEs are decided not to be transferred to the 
private sector due to the national development strategies. (v) SOEs that shall remain in 
the public sector as a matter of national policy. Those enterprises in (iv) and (v) 
 13
categories are in needs of reforms in financial investment, rules of operations, monitoring 
and evaluation… 
4.1.1.1. Restructuring 
Restructuring a SOE involves in making changes so that the SOE can operate more 
efficiently and become more attractive to potential investors before divestiture taking 
places (Guislain, 1997). It is clear that the purpose of restructuring is to enhance the value 
of a SOE (The UNCTAD, 1995). 
There are three forms of restructuring a SOE that are: organisational restructuring 
relating to readjusting a SOE to more reasonable and/or smaller units and reducing its 
redundant labours; financial restructuring dealing with accumulated dept of a SOE in 
order to eliminate the excess debt from its balance sheets and enhance its sale value; and 
finally, operational restructuring involving in investment for its modernisation and 
improvement of technology (UNCTAD, 1995; Guislain, 1997; Bornstein, 2000). 
4.1.1.2. Commercialisation and corporatisation 
Commercialisation is the introduction of commercial principles and objectives into the 
management and operations of a SOE with the aim to make SOE more profit-oriented 
(UNCTAD, 1995; Guislain, 1997). Part of this procedure may involve in removal of 
government subsidies. A SOE is coping with market disciplines and hard budget 
constraint. The commercialisation can take place by contract plans or performance 
agreements that are negotiated agreements between government as the owner of a SOE 
and the SOE itself (UNCTAD, 1995).  
Corporatisation have been applied to a medium or large-scale enterprises in strategic 
economic sectors. Corporatisation is the transformation of a SOE into a corporation or 
other form of business organisation that is established and operating under relevant law. 
The government still retains its equity ownership. When the corporation is operating 
profitably and has a stable market position the government may sell its equity shares 
(UNCTAD, 1995; Guislain, 1997). 
4.1.2. Privatisation of Management 
4.1.2.1. Management contract 
A management contract is an agreement by which a public entity contracts with a private 
firm or individual for the operation of a SOE (UNCTAD, 1995; World Bank, 1995).  
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Management contracts are used mainly where the government wish to recover a SOE 
from loss-making situation by introducing private enterprise management methods in 
order to increase the net worth and the future sale value of the SOE (UNCTAD, 1995). 
There are some problems concerning the management contract that are mainly relating to 
the duality of private management and the state ownership. The conflict between the state 
and the private contractor’s interests. The private operator tend to reduce his commitment 
to performance due to he has no equity stake. This problem can be eliminated more or 
less by making a link between profit, outputs or sales and management fee. If the sale of 
the SOE is expected it should be specified in the contract that creates incentives for the 
private operator to improve the efficiency of the SOE. The private operator may try to 
achieve better financial result or increase productivity by resorting the excessive layoffs, 
wage cuts or over-investment especially when the state is bearing the political and 
financial cost of these decisions.   
The management contract should clearly stipulate: scope and nature of services provided 
by the contractor, the criteria to evaluate the performances of contractor and procedures to 
monitor the contract, the amount of fees and the modality of payment, the private 
operator’s power especially regarding the pricing and investment, and the rules 
concerning labour force employment (UNCTAD, 1995). 
The management contract is similar to leases as different form of non-divestiture 
privatisation. The contractor has to pay the contract fee that may or may not link to profit. 
Moreover, the private operator does not have any authority to set or change the financial 
provisions regarding the cost and investment and the government still reserves this right. 
4.1.2.2. Leases 
A lease is contractual arrangement whereby the owner of an asset (the lessor) grants 
another party (the leasee) the right to use the asset and to profit from it for an agreed 
period of time in return for the payment of rent. Leasing can take some different forms, 
the most significant forms include operating lease that the lessor is required to maintain 
and service the leased assets and the lessee has the right to cancel the contract before its 
expiration; financial and capital leases that the risks and benefits from the ownership of 
the leased assets are transfer to the lessee and the lessor is not responsible for maintaining 
the leased assets; and sale and lease back arrangement that the enterprise that owned the 
assets sells them to another party and, at the same time, it leases back the sold assets from 
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this buyer for a given period. In practice, leases often combine some features of different 
types of leases and so-called combination leases (UNCTAD, 1995). 
Leasing offers certain advantages to the public authorities, for example, bringing new 
technology and management skills, the government’s giving away the operation costs and 
investment risks, and also ceasing subsidies without scarifying the its ownership, 
improvement of efficiency and financial performance, increased tax income for the 
government, prospective lessee being easier to find out than a buyer.  
A leasing contract should cover issues of the degree of autonomy to be entrusted to lessee 
comprising powers and rights, responsibilities and obligations, the nature of regulations 
regarding pricing, production, subsidies and taxation, the modalities and responsibility in 
term of financing redundancy and severance payment, the amount and modalities of 
payment, mechanisms to review the contract (UNCTAD, 1995). 
4.1.2.3. Concession 
In granting concession the government transfers operating and development rights to a 
private sector entity. Concession can be granted at municipal, national levels and 
sometimes at international level. The holder of concession will have to pay capital 
expenditures and investment. For this reason, many governments prefer concession to 
leases (UNCTAD, 1995; Guislain, 1997).  
The concession usually requires large investment so that the concessionaires should be 
careful when taking decisions especially in the economic sectors that are known to be 
highly risky. 
Concessions happen in three forms: an administrative act, a contract or a combination of 
both. Another typical type of concessions is build-operate-transfer (BOT) for private 
development of infrastructure. 
4.1.3. Contracting out 
Contracting out is the way that the authority contracts a private firm to perform some 
specific service in the place of public entity or in competition with it. Contracting out is 
the form of operating concession. Contracting out may be employed when the divestiture 
is not desirable or feasible for political or economic reasons. As other form of non-
divestiture, contracting out could be considered as an interim stage before divestiture. 
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Contracting out will be successful under the conditions of: the contractor has equipment 
and know-how technology; sufficient financial resources and reputation for good 
performance; the contract specifies the penalties if the service or products is low quality 
1or incomplete; a particular agency to monitor the contract; regular reports to the relevant 
authorities; and contract to be revoked if non-performance and significant breach of 
contract (UNCTAD, 1995). 
4.1.4. Joint-ventures 
In general understanding, a joint-venture can be defined as an association of two or more 
legal entities working together and sharing risks and benefits of the joint-venture. As an 
option of non-divestiture, the government could promote a joint-venture with private 
sector. The government may, first, retain the majority shareholding, and progressively 
reduce this proportion. Then it can become the minority shareholder or give away 
completely its equity shares (Naya, 1990). A joint-venture can also be formed by selling 
partially government shareholdings or by issuing new shares to a new partner. The 
formation of joint-ventures offers certain benefits to the government, for example, the 
introduction of private capital in reduces the risk of operating the SOE (Naya, 1990; 
Ramanadham, 1991; UNCTAD, 1995) and may contribute to the improvement of 
performance by allowing the private sector to monitor it (Ramanadham, 1991). Another 
benefit is that the government still retains its interests in the areas considered “strategic” 
for national, economic or security reasons, meanwhile, allows the private sector’s 
participation in the promoting these areas (Naya, 1990, UNCTAD, 1995). 
There are several circumstances that the private capital might be introduced in a SOE to 
form a joint-venture company. In the first circumstance, the enterprise needs to expand 
but the government does not have funds enough to finance the expansions or it does not 
want to borrow due to the limits of public debt. On the other hand, the enterprise is in 
need of technological restructuring or the introduction of new technology, which the 
collaborator is only giving out under the conditions that he has the rights to share 
management and profit by equity share. Possibly, the government wants to bind with an 
equity stake that induces him to offer satisfactory technical assistance (Ramanadham, 
1991).  
The main issues usually included in a joint-venture agreement with the involvement of a 
SOE are: the scope and purpose of business activities; the legal status of a venture; the 
 17
amount, ratio, and form of contribution by each party; rules regulating the final transfer 
of shares; rules regulating the Board of Directors, terms and consequences of venture 
termination; force majeure, dispute resolution, arbitration, and governing law 
(Ramanadham, 1991; UNCTAD, 1995).  
The joint-ventures set the stage for total divestiture over time and subject to two 
constraints that are the high profitable level of the enterprise making the government feel 
unwilling to share its equity holding and the unwillingness to give away any privileges of 
patronage the enterprise vests in them of civil servants (Ramanadham 1991).  
4.2. Divestiture options 
4.2.1. Direct sale to general investors 
Direct sale is that the state ownership shares of a SOE are sold directly to private buyers 
(UNCTAD, 1995; Gray, 1996). Other service forms of financial intermediaries such as 
brokers, underwriters or public share offering are not necessary to be taken. Direct sale 
can be carried out by two possible manners that are through competitive bidding (direct 
sale by tender) and to a predetermined selected buyer (UNCTAD, 1995). 
The form of tendering allows the government to compare competing bidders and select 
the buyer offering the highest purchasing price and the greatest compliance of various 
government requirements and privatisation objectives. The tendering also offers the 
transparency compared to selected buyer predetermination. The only minor thing is that 
the public tendering is slow progress and administrative costly. The direct sale to selected 
buyer is lack of transparency and competition (UNCTAD, 1995; Gray, 1996). It is 
conveniently used only when there are a limited number of potential buyers having 
sufficient financial and managerial resources (UNCTAD, 1995). 
Direct sale has been used in many developing countries since there is an undeveloped 
capital market or non-existence so that public share offering is not feasible. Another 
reason is that direct sale is relatively easy to be prepared and executed. It is consequently 
suitable to the divestiture of small and medium enterprises (UNCTAD, 1995). 
4.2.2. Public share offerings on the stock markets 
This option of divestiture is often used to raise the capital, transfer ownership shares of an 
enterprise, and promote the transparency and diversification of ownership through the 
allocation of a proportion of shares to small investors (UNCTAD, 1995; Guislain, 1997). 
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This method is typically applied to profitable and large enterprises (UNCTAD, 1995; 
Gray 1996). The shares are offered on the stock market, generally at fixed price. 
Transparency is higher than direct sale of a SOE because of the advertising and disclosure 
requirements associated with public share offer so that this is preferable when 
transparency is highly important consideration (UNCTAD, 1995). 
Variations of this divestiture option are relating to some certain factors such as the fixing 
price of shares or targeted buyers. The success of public share offerings is depending 
partly on the level of capitalisation market relative to the size of share offer. Capital 
market imperfections, low capitalisation market, or other factor such as political risk can 
affect the realisation of asset values below the values which would be indicated by 
standard technique of valuation on the basis of expected future earnings (UNCTAD, 
1995).  
4.2.3. Private offering or placement with ‘strategic’ investors 
In private placement, an enterprise or controlling stake is sold to a limited number of 
investors. Additionally, the government usually negotiates directly with investors so that 
the underwriting role of investment banks is abandon (Bornstein, 2000). Private 
placement is, generally, involving in much less government regulation compared to 
public offering and it costs less flotation costs comprising issuing and printing fees and is 
going with greater speed. 
Private offering is suitable to some certain circumstances. First of all, when the SOE is 
not large enough to be offered to public since the flotation cost is higher than revenue 
expected private offering is desirable. It is also good for the case that the SOE is in poor 
financial performance and inadequate management and it needs transferring to an 
experienced private manager to turn the situation around. It is possible when a SOE is in 
need of improvement of new technology or access to foreign markets. Finally, when the 
weaknesses of capital market make public issue of share unsuccessful (UNCTAD, 1995). 
On the other hand, private placement has some possible disadvantages. The first 
disadvantage is the concentration of ownership or controlling interest in a single strategic 
investor. The risk of under-pricing the SOE in question since the government cannot 
assess its true market value like the investors do is also a disadvantage. Political 
oppositions to private offering arise because of possible corruption and favouritism. 
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Private offering for the controlling proportion can be done by tendering and also be used 
in combination with public offering for the rest allocating to small investors. 
4.2.4. Public auction 
Public auctions are predominantly used for small and medium sized SOEs, which do not 
require technology transfer or other special inputs. Public auctions are usually regulated 
by law and provide for open competitive bidding so that it is highly transparent 
privatisation technique. It is maximising, simultaneously, the proceeds of privatisation 
provided that an adequate group of competing buyers can be gathered together. The 
process is comparatively fast and uncomplicated (UNCTAD, 1995). 
Disadvantage of public auctions is the impossibility to impose condition for sale, auction 
sale prices varying due to some certain factors. It is necessary to be sure that the public 
auctions are sufficiently publicised and that potential competing buyers can be present on 
the day of auction. Public auction’s success needs regulations and experienced 
auctioneers.  
4.2.5. Employee/management buy-outs and employee share ownership plans 
The shares of the SOE (or its assets to form a new enterprise) were sold to employees in 
an employee buyout, to managers in a management buyout or to both groups in a 
management-employee buyout (UNCTAD, 1995; Gray, 1996; Bornstein, 2000). This 
privatisation technique is also known as “internal privatisation” since the 
managers/employees gain the ownership of the SOEs they work for. Most buy-outs have 
involved in small and mediums-sized and labour intensive SOE because the 
managers/employees are lack of available resources (United Nation, 1995).  
The success of management/employee buy-outs is greatly depending on the competencies 
and experiences of key actors (UNCTAD, 1995; Gray, 1996). There may be an active role 
of donors to help management and staff to improve commercial competencies and hence 
increase the chance of success of this privatisation technique (UNCTAD, 1995). 
Management/employee buy-outs offer a number of advantages. This form of privatisation 
creates incentives for manager/employees to cut costs, improve productivity and due to 
personal equity ownership stake. They facilitate restructuring of concerned SOE by 
reducing social costs. They also promote the ownership diversification and popular 
participation in production (UNCTAD, 1995; Gray, 1996). 
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Another means for improvement of management/employee buy-out performance is using 
Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOP) under which employee are allowed to buy 
shares on favourable terms. The company typically set up a trust fund to which it 
contributes of shares of its own. Employees can borrow money and purchase stock with 
the company making cash contribution to enable them to repay the loan. Some conditions 
should be attached to ESOP (UNCTAD, 1995; Gray, 1996)  
4.2.6. Mass privatisation 
Mass privatisation is bases on the population-wide distribution of vouchers and 
certificates free of charge or for a nominal fee. Usually, these vouchers are distributed to 
all adult citizens but in some certain circumstances, working experience is also taken into 
consideration. The main advantage of mass privatisation is rapid transfer of ownership 
from state to individual shareholders. Moreover, by creating vast class of shareholders, it 
encourages popular support for the whole privatisation process (UNCTAD, 1995; Gray, 
1996). 
Mass privatisation takes place in some transition economies that ownership of the assets 
of the means of production was considered to belong to people as a whole and 
represented by the state. Additionally, almost the entire economy is in hand of the 
government so that rapid ownership transformation could not be possible by more 
standard forms of privatisation. There are some arguments against mass privatisation that 
is not resulting in economic efficiency improvement of SOEs due to wide dispersed 
ownership and not addressing to real problems such as undercapitalised, huge debts, 
stagnant equipment, low management skill facing by enterprises (UNCTAD, 1995). 
4.2.7. Liquidation 
In some certain circumstances, the government prefers liquidating a SOE and sell its 
assets instead of selling it as an ongoing enterprise. The process of liquidation will be a 
non-divestiture if the assets are leased after liquidation. Liquidation is taking place when 
the government found out that the sale values of individual assets are higher than that of 
ongoing enterprise concerned or simply when prospective investors do not want to buy 
the SOE as a whole. Moreover, it is possibly occurs when the assets are no longer serving 
the economic purposes they were created or potential for saving the enterprise financial 
performance is highly risky. This may be a result of that the deficit of the state budget is 
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so high that it is necessary to liquidate the SOE or that the creditors file a petition 
initiating bankruptcy procedures (UNCTAD, 1995). 
In liquidation followed by sales of assets it is important to achieve sale price as high as 
possible probably by tender or auction. 
5. Sources of poor economic performance of state-owned enterprises  
5.1. Laid-outs and moral hazard 
Compared to a private enterprise, the SOE, being established by the state, enjoy 
considerably preferential conditions created by the state, for example, the possibility to 
access scare resources, financial subsidies, and particularly some monopolistic powers. 
Moreover, the managers of a SOE turn out to be not frightened by lost of their positions 
resulted from losses or bad performance of the SOE since the state is bearing losses of the 
SOE. These lead to lack of incentives for the SOE to be efficient.  
The guarantee of the government for the losses of SOEs produces moral hazard problem. 
Moral hazard is defined as the risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into a 
contract in good faith, has provided misleading information about its assets, liabilities, or 
credit capacity, or has an incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a 
profit before the contract settles (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 2000). The SOE may 
possess some exclusive information that cannot be accurately observed by others and the 
government cannot observe or monitor this information. So, assignment of full 
responsibility to a party is not made and parties are risk averse. Taking advantages from 
exclusive information, the SOE has a chance to exploit state capital and spend this capital 
for personal purposes (World Bank, 1995). Many SOEs perform deficits but these 
enterprises blame affects of random events for these deficits and they have compensations 
from the government for their losses. 
By the purchasing insurance from the state and exploiting exclusive information, SOEs 
are usually not afraid of their losses or bad performance, and they do not have any bear of 
bankruptcy because they often enjoy compensation scheme from the state for their 
failures through incomplete contracts. However, the state provides insurance for SOEs to 
maintain the state sector due to many reasons in terms of economic and social aspects. 
That why, the SOEs have to pursue extra-objectives.    
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5.2. Multiple objectives and rent seeking  
5.2.1. Multiple objectives 
Unlike private enterprises that pursue profit maximisation objectives and profit indicator 
becomes an important instrument to evaluate their performance, it is very complicated for 
assessing the SOE’s performance. Even for SOEs only pursuing commercial objectives, 
profit could not be a reliable indicator, because the divergence of relevant accounting 
categories and price. The difficulty in assessment of the SOE is more exacerbated when 
SOE implements extra-enterprise objectives including commercial and non-commercial 
objectives. The state sector pursues extra-enterprise objectives and private sector pursues 
only profit maximising objective due to differences in motivations of managers. SOEs 
have to operate in some unprofitable industries (public goods) but they have positive 
effects on the society.  
The extra-enterprise objectives could undermine the commercial performance of the 
enterprise as mentioned above. There are conflicts between extra-enterprise objectives, 
all objectives need to be weighted and summed to obtain an overall measure of 
performance. 
5.2.2. Rent seeking 
It is clear that some monopolies are created and protected by the government. The 
government created monopolies for SOEs and often provides many preferential 
conditions to protect these monopolistic SOEs from competition. A monopolistic position 
of SOEs could raise rent-seeking problem generating two significant consequences. First, 
social loss that comes from the fact that resources have been invested into unproductive 
activity since the government spent money on maintenance of monopolies. Second, it 
leads to the restriction of private sector development. For example, the price is 
determined by the government with the monopoly position as well as does not follow the 
cost-price relationship and some private enterprises producing similar products are facing 
deficits due to the lower price regulated by the government.  
When lack of competition, SOEs do not have to take care about minimising costs of 
production, researching and developing market, maximising profit target, etc. With 
monopoly position, SOEs have right to control price themselves. In addition, the 
government lacks a punishment and reward system on performance. Both above reasons 
lead to SOE’s inefficient operation but still existing in the economy. 
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5.2.3. Tenure and remuneration system 
In SOEs, the designation of management is often under political pressure while 
remuneration does not link with the enterprise’s performance but is fixed according to 
level of position. That is understandable from the fact, SOE is an enterprise but it also is 
an organic of the government. The management in the SOE is often composed of 
government officers, so the management would enjoy the payment as administrative 
officers. In addition, because it is usually difficult to assess performance of a SOE due to 
the ambiguity of extra-enterprise objectives, the compensation system is often not 
relevant to the outcome. It is difficult for the government to fire jobs, due to the 
protection of civil administrative system from political pressure. The combination of the 
limitation on rewards for good performance and the absence of punishment for bad 
performance have distorted the incentives of management of SOEs, discouraging them to 
be in line with owners interests. 
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III. THE REFORM OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN VIETNAM 
1. A profile of Vietnam’s state-owned enterprises  
1.1. Pre-renovation stage (prior to 1986) 
The formation of the state-owned enterprise system in Vietnam, after the end of French 
colonisation in the North in 1954 and the unification of the nation in 1975, was by 
nationalised private enterprises and mainly by new state’s establishment. Since then, the 
state sector had been playing the most important role in the national economy. 
As in other economies pursuing the centrally planning economic mechanism, Vietnamese 
SOEs were under the full control of the government in term of inputs, outputs and 
enterprise governance by mandatory planning and self-sufficient goods supplies. The 
government intervened in any stages of production, distribution, and consumption of 
goods. Managers were supposed to make decisions SOE operations but, in fact, they did 
not fully enjoy their rights. They were doing under pressures of the plans determined 
what to produce and even how to produce from higher planning levels so that the 
autonomy management did not exist actually. 
On the other hand, the planning system was slowly reformed and not flexible enough to 
react with changes of the market. The principle of bottom-up planning was not properly 
implemented. The development strategies were not clearly determined particularly the 
objectives, implementations, problems arising and solutions. This issue itself caused 
many troubles for production and business activities and led to uncontrollable situations. 
The governance institutions of SOEs were too heavy and rigid. There were so many 
intermediate institutions in the system creating serious red tape and heavy bureaucracy. 
As a result, the planning was of command characteristics only and impractical causing 
low economic efficiencies of SOEs (Vo Dai Luoc et al, 1997). 
1.2. Renovation stage (since 1986) 
SOEs officially entered the new era after the governmental Decision No. 217-HDBT of 
24 November 1987 on comprehensive reform of SOEs. It enabled SOE’s manager to 
enjoy autonomy management and abolished subsidies and the centrally planning system 
imposed to SOEs. 
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1.2.1. Socio-economic renovation  
With the economic renovation also known as “Doi Moi” triggered by the Vietnamese 
government in 1986, SOEs turned to completely new development period. SOEs played 
the leading role and supported non-state enterprises that were not promoted by the former 
centrally planning based system. This new approach also deleted the discrimination 
between SOEs and non-state sector enterprises and created competitive environments for 
all enterprises.  
SOEs are classified into two categories: profit-making and public-utility. Profit-making 
SOEs are operating in free competitive markets. The latter comprises all SOEs providing 
goods or services in accordance with the production, management, prices, and costs set 
forth by the government. The state ownership structure in SOEs has been restructured as 
followings. The state only remains its 100% ownership of SOE’s assets where necessary 
and feasible, and for the rest of SOEs the state may own more or less than 50% of 
enterprise’s assets depending on the business SOEs engage in. This is also called the 
ownership diversification aiming at promoting the participation of private capitals. 
The reductions of the number of SOEs as well as the increase of state capital and scale of 
SOEs are the new development tendency in the economic renovation. Beside, the criteria 
for evaluating economic efficiency of SOEs have been considerably modified (Vo Dai 
Luoc et al, 1997). The direct intervention of governance institutions in SOE operations 
will be also abolished.  
1.2.2. Economic performance and efficiency 
1.2.2.1. Production, capital and labour 
In the late of 1980s, the number of SOEs tremendously increased to 12,297 causing a 
strong financial pressure on the state budget for bearing losses and subsidies. This 
number reduced to 6,310 in 1995, 5,655 in 2001 and 5,175 in the end of 2002. The 
reduction of the number of SOEs in the early 1990s was the result of liquidation and 
dissolution of local affiliated loss-making SOEs, and in the late of 1990s, of equitisation 
as well. Together with the reduction of SOE number, the government has invested 
considerably capital in SOEs. Consequently, the average capitalisation of SOEs was 
going up and the proportions of SOEs having state capital less than 1 billion VND 
declined sharply (Table 1).  
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Most of SOEs were small in term of employees: 46.1% of SOEs having less than 100 
employees, 43.2% of SOEs having between 100 – 500 employees, and just 0.7% of SOEs 
having more than 3,000 employees (Nguyen Ngoc Tuan et al, 1996). The ratio of labour 
to capital of SOEs has been increasing since 1991 and particularly that of the enterprises 
in the northern region has risen drastically (OECF, 1998). 
Table 1: Some figures of the number and capital of SOEs from 1990 
 1990 1995 2001 
GDP share by SOEs (%) 32.5 38.3 39.5 
Number of SOEs  12,297 6,310 5,655 
Capital (billion VND) 27,817 77,656 126,030 
Average state capital per SOE (billion VND) 1.4 7.1 22 
SOEs with capital < 1 billion VND (%) 71.9 44 18.2 
1.2.2.2. Cost, profit and liability structure 
The ratio of production costs to sales decreased in a certain extent in the period from 1991 
to 1995. The costs of raw materials and wages constitute about three fourths of all input 
costs (OECF, 1998).  Many new costs have appeared. These are largely marketing costs 
and include costs for exhibitions, advertising, consultants (legal and technological), 
technical royalties, sales commissions, etc. and these have created additional costs for the 
enterprises. 
SOEs across all the regions, all the industries and all affiliations increased their income 
and profits. Central affiliated SOEs had profit ratio was consistently higher than that of 
enterprises belonging to local government. The profit ratio also differed significantly 
depending on business categories (OECF, 1998). 
Bank loans and inter-enterprise liabilities are the largest liability for the SOEs and 
constitute 90.6% of total liabilities. Unpaid taxes, wages and bonuses often constitute a 
large share of the total liability. The number of enterprises with such liabilities is not as 
large as those with bank loans and inter-enterprise liabilities (OECF, 1998). 
1.2.3. Technology, investment and assets 
80 – 90% of equipment used in Vietnam had been imported from former Soviet Union, 
China and Eastern European countries until 1987. Since then equipment has been 
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imported through mainly foreign direct investment from Asian newly developed 
countries such as Taiwan, Singapore. The technology in SOEs is outdated; the time of 
equipment exploitation is several dozens of years. Technological research, 
implementation and development capacities of SOEs are low particularly high-tech 
production technology requiring professional and skilful personnel. 
Most of SOEs made active investment (OECF, 1998). SOEs are making a partial 
investment for equipment renewal or to expand production capacity. The investment 
funds are generated from budget allocation, retained profits, bank loans and other 
borrowings. In the early 1990s, investment expenditures from national budget allocation 
and retained profits were the main sources of investment funds. Since the late of 1990s, 
these main sources have changed to bank loans and retained profits due to the changes of 
investment policy of the government to reduce the subsidies from national budget and 
public investment. 
The scales of fixed assets expanded in the SOEs across all the industries (OECF, 1998). 
The number of SOEs with a fixed asset scale less than 1 billion VND has been decreasing 
and the number of SOEs with a fixed asset scale more than 5 billion VND has been 
increasing by liquidation and re-registration of SOEs. 
1.2.4. Competitive environment 
It can be seen that the competition between SOEs themselves is most serious. 
Nonetheless, the nature of competitors is different depending on region, affiliation, and 
business category. For the enterprises in the North, the competition with small private 
enterprises is intense while in the South the competition with foreign enterprises and 
imports is fiercer than with small private enterprises (OECF, 1998).  
The competitive environment in the Vietnamese economy will intensify due to an 
increase in the entry of foreign enterprises, as well as trade liberalisation in the AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area). Under this circumstance, it is necessary to boost the current 
competitive capacity that is slow as a result of preferential treatment in term of fund 
raising.  
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2. The reform of SOEs in Vietnam 
2.1. Objectives of the SOE reform 
The reform of SOEs in Vietnam has been carried out since 1986 as a part of the overall 
economic renovation in the country with the approach that SOEs are playing the leading 
role in the market-oriented economy. The government defined three developmental 
objectives for the SOE reform as follows (Le Dang Doanh, 1996): 
Promote competition and hence improve the efficiency of SOEs 
Create an environment of co-operation and promote joint-ventures between enterprises in 
different sectors of the economy (that are both state and non-state sector enterprises); also 
establish joint-ventures with foreign companies thereby improve economic efficiency, 
technology and managerial skills for SOEs 
Attract resources for investment in the state sector financially in the form of shares, and 
promote equitisation as well as other elements of SOE reform  
In the next ten-year period, the following objectives for the reform of SOEs in Vietnam 
have been determined (Nguyen Huu Dat and Nguyen Van Thao, 2002): 
• Strengthen SOEs so that the state sector shall be the leading in the national market-
oriented economy.  
Restructure SOEs with reasonable organisation, high economic efficiency, high capacities 
of competition, and having large market shares in key sectors and industries of the 
economy in order that the government will be able to control entirely the national 
economy and macroeconomic stability. 
Become the main motivating element to speed up the economic growth rate and the 
foundation of the production manufacturing, high technology and military industries 
creating strong basis for national industrialisation and modernisation. 
Guarantee necessary goods as well as public services for the society and national 
securities. 
2.2.  The necessities of SOE reform 
Beside historical reasons such as up and down political changes and long period of wars, 
the weakness of management system of the centrally planning economy and unreasonable 
structure of the national economy were the main reasons for the situation of low 
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efficiency and growth of SOEs. SOEs were supposed to be independent in economic 
decision-making but, in fact, they were still under pressure of planning regime and the 
direct intervention of heavy and complicated governmental bureaucracies. Moreover, 
state investments outspread over all sectors without focusing and sometimes uncontrolled 
due to unclear defined macroeconomic strategies (Vo Dai Luoc et al, 1997). Annually, 
the national budget had to bear losses and subsidies for SOEs causing its serious financial 
deficits since SOEs were not to be responsible for their operations. 
Before the economic renovation in 1986, the nationalisation of private enterprises 
resulted in the dominance of SOEs with sole state ownership and the low development of 
non-state sector enterprises. It was necessary to change this system in which SOEs play 
the leading role and support to the development of other sector enterprises. Free 
competitive environments would possibly improve the efficiency and competitiveness of 
SOEs. 
Another problem was that SOEs were uncontrollably established at all levels such small 
scales that a large proportion of SOEs was in chronic loss-making, overdue-debt situation 
and without development potentials. There were many SOEs were not formally founded 
by the state but still having been allocated state capital for operation. These enterprises 
mainly established by governmental institutions, social organisations and associations 
whose activities were funded by the state budget. So that there is a need for categorising 
SOEs, liquidating loss-making SOEs, abolishing government direct intervention into 
SOEs operations aiming at reducing small-scale enterprises and freeing state capital for 
certain specified targets. 
The government tends to diversify the ownership of SOEs involving more private capitals 
that allows the focus on some key economic sectors. The ownership diversification not 
only helps creating incentives for better productivity and financial performance of SOEs 
but also releases national budget from subsidies and mobilises state capital into 
preferential investment strategies. With achievements from the pilot implementation, the 
equitisation programme turned out to be very crucial to the SOE reform. It created 
incentives for the employees and managers of SOEs to perform better and 
simultaneously, the efficiency was also improved. The ownership diversification made 
employees more involved in the enterprises and brought better management schemes to 
SOEs. Furthermore, it is the effective measure to make SOEs more attractive to private 
capitals. However, this also requires sufficiently developed capital markets, especially the 
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stock exchanges as well as banking and credit reform for full benefits from investment 
sources other than the state. 
2.3. Legal framework and policies  
2.3.1. Legal framework reforms  
With the new approach of economic renovation in 1986 and to promote the SOEs’ role in 
the market-oriented economy, the government came up with new policies reforming 
structure and governance of SOE system. Governmental Decision No. 217-HDBT of 14 
November 1987 on the reform of the SOEs started a new era for the reform of SOEs in 
Vietnam. By this decision, the government introduced production and operational 
autonomy and self-supporting accounting principles for SOEs. The decision also 
abolished the mechanism of the existing subsidy system and achieved an initial 
encouraged result at the beginning of economic renovation process. 
Following Decision No. 217-HDBT, on 22 March 1988, the government promulgated the 
Charter of the Industrial Enterprises by the Decision No. 50-HDBT replacing previous 
regulations and the Decision No. 98 on 2 July 1988 prescribing the participation of SOE 
employees in management.  After their being in force, the government made substantial 
changes and supplements to the autonomy of the SOEs based on business experiences and 
practical situations. Dealing with joint-ventures, the Decree No. 28-HDBT on 22 March 
1988 was providing regulations on formation and operation of joint-ventures and the 
rights for SOEs to mobilise capital for any higher efficient performances.  
The government also promulgated series of regulations concerning SOE production, 
management scheme, and governance particularly important that were the Law on 
Bankruptcy (1993) and the State-Owned Enterprise Law (1995).  
As an attempt to group SOEs in large state corporations for strengthening international 
competitiveness, the government decided to form General Corporations (Decision No 
90/TTg in 1994 and Decision No 91/TTg in 1995). This was considered as an active step 
of the SOE reform process. The government also promulgated regulations on equitising 
(Decree No 44/ND-CP of 28 June 1998), securities and stock markets (Decree No 
48/1998/ND-CP of 1 July 1998), contracting out, selling, leasing, and buying out SOEs 
(Decree No 103/ND-CP of 10 September 1999, Decision No. 55/2000/QD-TTg of 22 
May 2000). Appendix I show important regulations relating to the reform of SOEs after 
the economic renovation in 1986. 
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2.3.2. Impacts of legal provisions  
The reform of SOEs in the early stage aimed mainly at implementing regulations of the 
government as in forms of various decrees and resolutions. Since the early 1990s, the 
progress has, however, tended to be more involved with legislation; in other words, the 
reform of SOEs has been further legitimated. 
Firstly, SOEs were granted autonomy with significant changes in planning and 
accounting regulations. SOEs were acting as fairly independent economic entities with 
reducing state subsidies and beginning competition with non-state sector enterprises. 
SOEs were permitted to determine the products to be manufactured only by registering 
the products at the provincial economic arbitration agencies of the local government; 
thereafter registration took place at the local planned investment agencies. The previous 
raw material supply subsidised by the state has been changed to a completely 
commercialised system. Distribution of goods based on centralised plans by the 
government was deleted and autonomy was given to SOEs. Consequently, SOEs were 
allowed to sale their products independently at market prices without government 
intervention. However, certain controls were still taken by the government according to 
the socio-political demands that were upper and lower limits of prices of electricity, 
petroleum, fertiliser, cement, steel, sugar, paper…(OECF, 1998) 
The Bankruptcy Law allows SOEs making loss or unable to repay overdue debts could be 
bankrupted or liquidated in compliance with procedures and formalities defined by this 
Law. This brought an end to the state obligation of bearing losses of SOEs and the 
decline of SOE numbers. In 1995, all SOEs turned to operate under the State-Owned 
Enterprise Law. This Law formed the legal basis for all operations of SOEs and created 
the equality between SOEs and non-state sector enterprises. A SOE was defined as a 
limited liability entity or SOEs and their managers have to bear all responsibilities 
concerning SOEs’ activities. SOEs are entrusted with state capital, organised and broadly 
administrated by the government for either profit-making or public-utility objective. 
Profit-making SOEs are granted autonomy and acting like non-state sector enterprises. 
Public-utility SOEs are operating under full government control from the inputs, outputs, 
costs and prices aiming at providing public services and national securities. For those 
SOEs, the government generally has special treatment. 
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SOEs also transformed into joint-stock companies, firstly by the pilot equitisation 
programme, with the goals of ownership diversification, efficiency improvement, and 
capital mobilisation. This pilot programme has been outspreading all over the country 
with large involvement of non-state sectors. However, SOE equitisation has been very 
slowly implemented due to some economic and political reasons but most significantly 
lack of institutional and legal frameworks. 
With the reforms of taxation, banking and credit system, SOEs have been operating with 
less state subsidies and changes of the state budget payment manner and increasingly 
competition of non-state sector enterprise in capital market. 
2.4. Restructuring SOE system 
2.4.1. Establishing and developing General Corporations  
Vietnamese General Corporations hereinafter referred to as corporations were established 
by governmental Decision 90/TTg (1994), Decision 91/TTg (1995) and Decree No 39/CP 
promulgated their Model Charter (1995) and operating under the State-Owned Enterprise 
Law for the purpose of improving efficiency and competitiveness and focusing on some 
certain key industries. There were 18 corporations established under direct control of the 
central government with legal capital not less than 1,000 billion VND and 78 other 
corporations under ministries and provincial governments authorised by the central 
government with legal capital not less than 500 billion VND. General Corporations have 
1,650 member enterprises accounting for 28.4% of the total number of SOEs, 65% of 
total state capital and 61% of labours of all SOEs. 
Since being established, corporations have been playing a leading role in the national 
economy speeding up economic growth, providing important materials, products and 
services for the nation: electricity: 98%, coal: 97%, steel: 52%, papers: 48% and banking: 
70% of capital market share (Nguyen Huu Dat and Nguyen Van Thao, 2002). 
Corporations have been taking important part in macroeconomic stabilisation policies of 
the government particularly pricing system. Corporations have been preserving state 
capital and mobilising more investment for technology upgrade and productivity 
enhancement. For example, until 2000, 17 corporations mobilised 17,038 billion VND 
accounting for 22.5% of total capital and, generally, productivity of corporations has been 
increasing 30% to 80%. In 2000, though the national economy was facing many 
difficulties, corporations were still growing. Revenues increased 27.6%, state budget 
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payment increased 39,9% compared to that of 1999. Corporations have been utilising 
competitive advantages, available resources to improve financial performance, 
production, marketing and employment. As a result, there were many other locally 
affiliated SOEs applied for corporation membership. 
There have been still some problems concerning corporations’ operations. Corporations 
are given preferential conditions from the government but still lack of capital, outdated 
technology, low efficiency and competitiveness. Average capital of a central affiliated 
corporation, in 2000, was 3,885 billion VND  and that of a ministerial or provincial 
affiliated corporation was 284 billion VND far from the minimum limit of 500 billion 
VND. A number of corporations could not complete their duties in keeping macro-
balance of providing necessary materials and goods for production and society. Some of 
them are still depending on governmental subsidies and monopolistic position in 
domestic markets so that they do not have any attempts to reduce costs, improve 
technology and management and be prepared for international integrations. Organisation 
and structure of corporations are not reasonable. Staff of corporation is still not 
competent enough. The appointments of Presidents and General Directors (Chief 
Executive Officers) of several corporations have been done with problems of 
competences and abilities. 
Although corporations are operating under the State-Owned Enterprise Law, they have 
not yet been empowered with complete rights given. There are still state interventions in 
their operations and even member enterprises’. Corporations have not yet managed and 
coordinated the capital flows between member enterprises. Moreover, the structure and 
organisation of corporations have been adjusted for many times but still not reasonable. 
The Board of Management has not yet performed as the role of the state ownership 
representative. There have been overlaps between Board of Management’s and General 
Director’s duties and responsibilities. Relationships between corporation and member 
enterprises are still administrative and not yet based on demands for production, finance, 
duties and interests. Member enterprises are still lack of co-operations that create overall 
powers for the corporations. 
2.4.2. Classifying, restructuring and developing public-utility SOEs  
Public-utility SOE is the enterprise carrying out national security duties or producing 
products or providing public services in compliance with the policies, costs and prices 
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specified by the government and operating not for profit-making purpose (Decree No. 56 
ND-CP of 02 October 1996). Until 2001, there were 734 public-utility SOEs accounting 
for 13% of the total SOE number and 12% of total state capital (15,125 billion VND) 
operating in weapon manufacturing and repairing services, transportation (aviation, 
railway and maritime), agriculture (irrigation system, breeding)... In term of technology, 
except enterprises operating in aviation, maritime navigation and national securities, the 
majority of public-utility SOEs is low technology, outdated equipment originated from 
different supplying sources. Many enterprises operating in agriculture, fisheries, and 
forestry are still highly labour intensive. 
 Average state capital per public-utility SOEs is 20.6 billion VND as high as 93% of that 
of a profit-making SOE, however, 67.5% of public-utility SOEs has average state capital 
lower than 5 billion VND. Public-utility SOEs just mostly pay attention to the completion 
of assigned plans but not attempts to reduce production costs, and service prices 
particularly the quality. Regulations on criteria for categorisation of public-utility SOEs, 
authorities of and responsibilities for public-utility SOE foundation are not clear. There is 
also increasing tendency for the transformation of profit-making into public-utility SOEs 
to benefit from state subsidies. There is the need for the promotion of more active 
involvement of non-state sectors in public-utility provisions that, at some certain levels, 
the government can allow the private sector participation. 
2.4.3. Transferring, contracting out, selling, and leasing loss-making SOEs 
From the promulgation of the Decree No 103/1999/ND-CP in 1999 on transferring, 
selling, contracting out and leasing SOEs to November 2002, 46 SOEs were sold, 76 
SOEs were transferred and another 6 SOEs were switched to operate under contracting 
out (Vietnam News, 16 December 2002). 
Compared to the situation before the transfer, there were remarkable annual increases of 
business capital: 67.3%, revenues: 42.5%, payment to the national budget: 44.5%, 
employment: 12.8%, and average labour incomes: 38.7%. Several enterprises have 
developed plans for production expansion. The application of those reform measures 
helped preventing SOEs from bankruptcy or liquidation, unemployment of SOE workers, 
saving state capital and releasing the state from financial deficits (Nguyen Huu Dat and 
Nguyen Van Thao, 2002).  
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Nonetheless, the legal and institutional frameworks are still not completed creating many 
overlaps and difficulties in practice. For example, the regulations for solving debts and 
surplus labours have not been promulgated. Many ministries and provinces have not yet 
determined plans and strategies for the process. 
2.4.4. Equitising SOEs  
2.4.4.1. Perception of the concept “Equitisation” 
Equitisation is understood as the process of an enterprise with single owner to be a joint-
stock company with more than one shareholder and operate under the Company Law. 
Equitisation can take place with private enterprises, limited liability companies, joint-
ventures and state-owned enterprises. Equitisation is the process of diversifying 
ownership of an enterprise (Ngo Quang Minh et al, 2001). Equitisation of SOE is the 
transfer of a SOE to a joint-stock company of which the government may or may not be a 
shareholder. It is not only the ownership transfer from state to private parties but also the 
measure to raise more funds is carried out by selling its shares. 
 In a broad sense, equitisation is a form of privatisation by diversifying SOE ownership 
and selling whole or part(s) of state assets in a SOE. However, equitisation is not 
considered as privatisation because, in a narrow sense, the privatisation is the transfer of 
ownership of entire state assets to private parties. Consideration of whether or not 
equitisation is privatisation depends on the levels of state assets being sold to private 
parties (Ngo Quang Minh et al, 2001). There are two opinions about equitisation. Some 
argue that equitisation does not follow the socialist direction due to the loss of 
governmental control of state assets. But some point out that the equitisation is necessary 
stage for the economic transition to the market-oriented economy. 
2.4.4.2. Goals of equitisation 
Equitisation of the SOEs in Vietnam was introduced with some objectives. It is mainly 
aiming at improving economic efficiency of state sector, reducing deficits of state budget 
due to subsidies and bearing SOE’s losses, utilising any available capital resources in the 
economy and making employees be shareholders of the enterprises. Firstly, equitisation 
takes part in the economic renovation as a motivation for development of the national 
economy and improves the dynamic and competitiveness of the whole economy 
particularly SOE system. 
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Secondly, equitisation mobilises all of capital resources available for investment aiming 
at improving technologies, management, efficiency, and employment in the state sector. 
The reform of the SOE management and operational structure is the third goal of SOE 
equitisation. Additionally, equitisation ensures the state ownership of assets, preserves 
and develops assets and capitals of whole nation whose representative is the government. 
However the government does not equitise SOEs considered to be necessary under sole 
state ownership. 
Finally, equitisation facilitates employee’s exercise of being shareholders of the 
enterprises and strengthens the binding between employees and shareholders of the 
enterprise. 
2.4.4.3. Initial achieved results 
Before 1999, only a small number of 116 SOEs had been equitised. This number was 249 
in 2000. Among them, 45 SOEs were loss-making and the rest was in unstable profitable 
situation and generally low profit. As of 31 May 2002, 631 SOEs including part(s) of 
SOEs were equitised accounting for 11% of the total SOE number with re-evaluated state 
asset values of 2,714 billion VND (not including the land-use right) increasing 13.7% 
compared to pre-equitised values and accounting for 1.97% of total state capital. As the 
end of 2002 the number of equitised SOEs was rising to 907 equivalent to about 16% of 
total SOEs. This was a remarkable attempt of the government to transfer SOEs to joint-
stock companies.  
Table 2: Proportions of equitised SOEs in 2000 
 
By state capitalisation  % 
< 1 billion VND 40.4 
1-5 billion VND 34.8 
5-10 billion VND 14.9 
> 10 billion VND 9.9 
By sector  
% 
Industry, Transportation and Construction  57 
Trading and Services 38 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 5 
 Source: Ministry of Finance, 2001  
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There were four modalities of equitisation having been implemented recently. First, the 
government held the original state asset value of the SOE and then issues more shares for 
raising equity (8.4%). Second, SOE’s assets being partly sold and equity being raised 
afterward (49%) was the most preferable by employees and outside shareholders for the 
purpose of mobilising more capitals and creating incentives. Complete transfer of SOEs 
to joint-stock companies without any state ownership remaining (26.4%) was the way 
enabling employees to be the real owner of the enterprises. Finally, equitisation of 
separated part(s) of SOEs (16.2%) was usually applied to relatively independent parts of 
SOEs that have separate production lines and supporting role to the SOE main 
production. When being equitised, the government still holds dominant shares to fully 
control the equitised. 
It was a remarkable result of equitisation that, after a period of operating post-
equitisation, the state capital was not only preserved but also raised. According to reports 
from 202 enterprises after one-year post-equitisation operation state capital rose from 
377.343 to 442.763 billion VND (17.3%). There were some other notable increasing 
figures of annual revenues: 1.4 times, total equity: 15%, profit: 2 times, payment to 
national budget: 1.2 times, employment: 5.1%, labour income: 1,4 – 5 times (Nguyen 
Huu Dat and Nguyen Van Thao, 2002). On the other hand, several equitised enterprises 
were loosing and gaining in some economic evaluation indicators but none of them was 
in loss-making or bankruptcy. 
2.4.4.4. Listing in stock markets  
The stock market was officially opened in July 2000 and has been operating in Vietnam 
since then with the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange Centre (HSTC). There were 21 
joint-stock companies and 10 bonds listed on HSTC. Of these, three fisheries processing 
companies were transformed from SOEs. Two of them were formerly central affiliated 
SOEs and the other one was local affiliated SOE.  
It was very important for a joint-stock company to be listed in the stock market. It helps 
the company to improve its loyalty in the market confirming the position and promised 
business future of the company and to raise equity more easily from the capital markets. 
Moreover, the company, by the participation of foreign shareholders, may expand 
accesses to foreign markets. 
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2.5.  Major issues of and possible solutions to the reform of SOEs 
2.5.1. The role of state sector in the economy and SOE position among all enterprises 
The appropriate selection will be necessary and determine the basic and consistent 
direction for the reform of SOEs. This direction should result in the policy ensuring the 
dominant role of state sector and also the leading role of SOEs. This policy should not be 
harmful to or prevent the development of non-state enterprises and their acquiring 
investment capitals from any sources other than the state’s (Phan Van Tiem and Nguyen 
Van Thanh, 1996). 
The market-oriented economic development has generated positive consequences as 
increase of investment, high growth rate and the expansion of non-state sectors for over 
fifteen years of economic renovation. No non-state sector can do the important role of 
SOEs in supplying essential public services especially national securities, the 
development of mountainous and remote areas, and key sectors that maintain the 
sustainable high growth. This is due to no or low profit, low rate of return on capital, 
large-scale investment, or high risk of investment recovery. 
2.5.2. The need for rapid overcome the problem of limited state capital 
The problem of limited state capital for investment has been recognised since the number 
of SOEs largely increased in the end of 1980s. Chronic loss-making of many SOEs and 
the piecemeal injection of small amount of capital into SOEs has caused low economic 
efficiency and low competitiveness of state sector. 
In the attempt to overcome this problem, the government has reduced the number of 
SOEs and increased the state capitalisation by merging and dissolving loss-making SOEs. 
The maintenance of SOEs spreading out all locations and all sectors is really a problem 
for the government since the state budget cannot raise enough funds to support them. 
There are some measures proposed. Firstly, it is necessary to develop the capital market 
that enables SOEs, within their legality, to benefit maximally from the domestic and 
foreign capital markets by credit system and issuing shares, bonds and any other 
commercial papers. Secondly, diversification of the ownership of SOEs is one of 
significant measures. It is the transformation of a SOE into a joint-stock or a limited 
liability company mainly by equitisation. There is the need for completing legal 
framework within which the transfer of state ownership and partial/complete withdrawal 
of state capitals from SOEs can be smoothly and quickly done. Finally, it is necessary to 
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liberalise the restrictive “management control by line ministry” regime and other 
regulations blocking the flow of state capital into SOEs and the decision making of 
SOE’s managers. 
2.5.3. Low level of capital performance throughout the state sector 
Poor capital performance placed a large restriction on reinvestment in SOEs and limited 
the ability to develop the state sector particularly in the situation of increasing 
competition from non-state sectors. Some reasons for this are piecemeal and dispersed 
state capital allocation manners, stagnating technology compared to other nations in the 
region, and management regime not creating incentives for managers and employees. 
There is an immediate need for clear distinction between profit-making and public-
utilitySOEs. This indistinctness gives profit-making SOEs the same state subsidies in 
forms of low interest credits and low land rental payment that are only offered for public-
utility SOEs. Consequently, profit-making SOEs appear profitable and payment to state 
budget revenues is affected as well. If the number of SOEs unnecessary to be 100% state 
ownership reduces, the government will free a considerably amount of capital for funding 
other necessary investment to modernise technology and improve efficiency of SOEs. 
The situation of low efficient performance of state capital is an unavoidable consequence 
of slow SOE restructuring process. 
2.5.4. The need for exact determination of the main elements of restructuring SOEs and 
creation of planning and policy 
This is an extremely significant issue leading the reform of SOEs to the right direction in 
order to achieve its ultimate objectives. The government should put all resources 
available, especially finance, to SOEs of key sectors of the economy and wholly owned 
by the government. It should also give first priority to the modernisation and technology 
improvement to develop infrastructures and public services essential for the development 
of the economy. Regarding the SOE management reform, incentives must be introduced 
to bring interests to managers and employees of the SOE. Managers of SOE should be 
granted with full authorities to make decision of the capital and assets capitalised by the 
state and they must be responsible for any of their decisions.  
Institutional and legal frameworks should be reformed that the governmental institutions 
taking part in co-ordinating the movement of the state sector only performs 
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administration and influence SOEs by policies but not directly intervenes into detail 
operations of SOEs and that all SOEs will be operating under the Company Law. 
2.5.5. Distinction of management and ownership of SOEs  
There is no clear distinction between the investment function or state ownership and the 
management function of the government. Because of a large number of SOEs at central 
and local levels, the local authorities and government institutions authorised to monitor 
state assets tend to intervene too much into operations of SOEs. SOE managers are in a 
very confused situation that they are granted with the right to make decisions on the 
allocated state capitals but it is not sufficiently legitimated or under pressure from 
governmental institutions. Consequently, there is a common perception that if the SOE is 
profitable it can benefit from this result and if the SOE is making loss the government as 
its owner has to bear this loss. This also resulted in that some SOEs are looking for and 
even relying on state subsidies hence the responsibility for economic efficiency of SOEs 
is not clearly defined. Profit-making SOEs are, therefore, in need of ownership 
transformation by equitisation or other forms of privatisation. In other words, profit-
making SOEs unnecessarily 100% owned by state can benefit from private capitals when 
being transferred to joint-stock companies. Furthermore, transformations allow these 
enterprises to operate under the market forces, therefore, releasing the state from 
subsidies and creating competitive fairness between all enterprises acting in the economy. 
It is essential to legitimate autonomy of SOE managers and to re-organise governmental 
institutions influencing SOEs only by macroeconomic policy but not direct intervention. 
2.5.6. The need for training and retraining SOE managers and other qualified 
employees 
The transition of the national economy from centrally planned to market-oriented 
economy has been carried out for over 15 years. The problem associating with training 
managers and employees of SOEs was addressed as low competencies, inappropriate 
business administration knowledge, especially when increasing competition between 
SOEs and non-state enterprises for high quality labours. 
Proper training and management of labour resources is important for the reform of SOEs. 
The economic renovation has brought experiences with market mechanism for the 
majority of SOE managers yet there are still many SOE managers incapable of managing 
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SOEs leading to chronic loss-making. It helps reforms of salary system, productive 
incentives, insurance and social benefits for managers and employees of SOEs.  
2.5.7. Continuation of macroeconomic renovation creating better economic and legal 
environment for SOE efficient performance 
Since 1989, macroeconomic policy reforms of the government have been broadly 
successful bringing initial remarkable results in restructuring SOE system. This help to 
control the increasing inflation in the late of 1980s and to stabilise inflation rate in recent 
years supporting high economic growth rate. The price reform having been transferring 
price system from determined by the state to market regulated has been importantly 
influencing SOE reform by forcing SOEs to participate in competitive markets. 
Following is the tax reform that levied tax rates to all type of profit-making enterprises 
operating in the economy on the basis of equal responsibility to national budget. The 
reform of banking and credit system effectively reduced the state credit subsidies for 
SOEs and created more dynamic capital markets.  
The continuation of reforms of price, tax, and banking and credit system is significant for 
the SOE restructuring. Restricted financial and credit policies are essential for 
macroeconomic stability and maintain low inflation rate but they should be changed on 
the basis of national economic development. Taxation system is also in need of further 
reform to create fair standard taxation to all enterprises.  
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IV. DATA AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
1. Data collection 
For fisheries general corporations and SOEs, only data on their general financial 
performance is available. The access to their individual income statements and balance 
sheets is prohibited. Detailed data on their performance is confidential and not allowed to 
be published. Data consolidated to generate balance sheets and income statements of 
SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation and fisheries SOE system is accessible in the 
Ministry of Finance.  
Data on financial performance of equitised companies was colleted. It is expressed in 
income statements and balance sheets of these companies. Since most of fisheries SOEs 
have been equitised recently (Appendix IV) data on their performance is collected only 
for Ha Long CANFOCO, the first fisheries SOE being equitised and SEASPRIEXCO 
No.4 relatively newly equitised. Apart from this, the reason for taking these companies is 
the availability and sufficiency of data. Data on post-equitisation performance of Ha Long 
CANFOCO and both pre-equitisation and post-equitisation but not completely of 
SEAPRIEXCO No. 4 was taken into consideration. Data is obtained from the Ho Chi 
Minh City Stock Exchange. However, these companies are not the most successful ones 
among equitised fisheries companies.  
In addition to poor financial data of SOEs, the differences between private and state 
sectors make the comparison of pre-equitisation and post-equitisation performance more 
difficult. 
2. Financial analysis and measurement 
The analysis conducted in this research is adopted from company analysis of Jones (1998) 
and financial analysis of Brealey and Mayers (2003). This financial analysis seeks to 
determine that whether the equitisation of fisheries SOEs is truly desirable and lives up to 
the expectation of the government on the performance of equitised enterprises.  
On a company level, the study is trying to determine whether the equitised enterprises 
increase in profitability, operating efficiency and financial performance. Some ratios 
measuring profitability including the return on asset ratio (ROA) reflecting how 
effectively and efficiently the company’s assets are used, the return on equity ratio (ROE) 
used as a general indication of how much profit it is able to generate given the resources 
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provided by its stockholders, payout ratio measuring the proportion of earnings that are 
paid out as dividend, net profit margin an indication of how effective a company is at cost 
control, and internal growth rate indicating the growth rate that a company can achieve 
without external funds are employed for assessing the performance of those equitised 
enterprises. 
To examine the operating efficiency of a company, asset turnover ratio showing how hard 
the company’s assets is being put in used, sales-to-net-working-capital determining 
whether a company is overtrading or conversely carrying more liquid assets than needed 
for its volume, days in inventory, inventory turnover and receivable turnover are used. 
Financial efficiency is examined by leverage ratios and liquidity ratios. Debt ratio and 
debt-to-equity ratio determine how much the company relies on debt to finance assets. 
Others such as current ratio, quick ratio, and cash ratio are employed to evaluate the 
liquidity ability of a company. 
The comparison of performance between pre-equitisation and post-equitisation is 
explaining the changes of profitability, operating efficiency and financial performance of 
these companies, in other words, the effects of privatisation on the company operation. 
The changes of macroeconomic and legal environments will be also taken into account.  
On higher levels, the impacts of the SOE reform can be evaluated by some important 
indicators. They include the decline of state share or the increase of private share in the 
sector, the reduction of fiscal imbalance through the increasing revenue and decreasing 
national budget deficit, the change in level of employment.  
3. Empirical result 
From financial performance data expressed in balance sheets and income statements of 
Ha Long CANFOCO and SEAPRIEXCO No. 4 (Appendix III), financial analysis is 
carried out to calculate financial ratios showing their profitability, operating efficiency, 
leverage and liquidity. This analysis is aim to observe the changes of these ratios since 
enterprises were equitised. Detail financial ratios of these joint-stock companies are 
showed in Table 3. However, limited data prevents the comparison of these ratios 
between pre- and post-privatisation. Statistics tests could not be done for checking 
whether post-privatisation changes are significant or not.  Comparison of companies’ 
financial ratios to that of the fisheries industry was also impossible since there is no 
reference available. 
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Profitability: Since being equitised, profitability of equitised companies has significantly 
improved through the increases of return on equity, return on asset, earnings per share 
ratios. Both of them have achieved highly increasing internal growth rates. Dividends 
paid to shareholders keep going up. For Ha Long CANFOCO, in 2002 profitability 
slightly declined probably resulting from the recession of the world fisheries market. 
Operating efficiency: has considerably increased by going up trends of asset turnover, 
sales-to-net-working-capital ratio, receivable turnover ratio, and increased sales…  
Leverage and liquidity: There is no sign of over reliance on debts, stable leverage status 
and leverage decreased compared to pre-equitisation, stable buffer between the debts and 
the companies’ ability to pay them. 
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Table 3 :   Financial ratios of Ha Long CANFOCO, 1999 – 2001 and SEAPRIEXCO No. 4, 2001 – 2002 
 Ha Long CANFOCO  SEAPRIEXCO No. 4 
 2002 2001 2000 1999*  2002 2001
Book value of a share 12,616 11,221 12,277 11,498  12,563 11,557
Profitability ratios        
ROE 17.28% 21.67% 16.15% 11.62%  27.17% 13.47%
ROA 9.49% 12.82% 9.22% 6.32%  13.02% 9.23%
EPS 2,180 2,431 1,983 1,336  3,413 1,595
Payout ratio 0.73 0.70 0.61 0.90  0.41 0.75
Dividend 16% 17% 15% 12%  14% 12%
Net profit margin 6.85% 4.70% 6.22% 8.60%  6% 5%
Internal growth rate 7.07% 8.65% 5.76% 1.44%  21.40% 2.30%
Efficiency ratios        
Asset Turnover 1.38 2.73 1.48 0.74  2.15 1.69
Sales to networking capital                        3.88 6.12 3.80 1.65  6.65 3.44
Days in inventory 7.26 40.20 177.30 68.19  207.61 237.86
Inventory turnover 3.75 9.08 2.06 5.35  1.76 1.53
Average collection period 86.09 47.58 177.70 90.75  15.34 14.74
Receivable turnover 4.24 7.67 2.05 4.02  2.97 2.50
Leverage ratios        
Debt ratio 20.66% 23.40% 28.70% 26.19%  50.85% 31.49%
Debt ratio (including short term debt) 44.90% 40.69% 45.49% 42.82%  50.85% 31.49%
Debt-equity ratio 26.04% 30.56% 40.26% 35.49%  - -
Liquidity ratios        
Net working capital to total assets 0.36 0.45 0.40 0.44  0.32 0.49
Current ratio 2.17 2.96 2.68 2.93  1.65 2.56
Quick ratio 1.21 1.74 1.64 1.67  1.47 2.33
Cash ratio 0.13 0.18 0.06 0.12  0.01 0.19
* on data of three last quarters  
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V. THE REFORM OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN THE FISHERIES 
SECTOR 
1. Establishment and restructuring of fisheries General Corporations  
With the aim to strengthen competitiveness of SOEs and create large and powerful state-
owned corporations, the government decided to establish corporations operating under 
the State-Owned Enterprise Law. Of these corporations, three operating in fisheries are 
under the control of the Ministry of Fisheries by the authorisation of the central 
government. These three corporations are Vietnam Seafood Product Export Corporation 
(SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation consisting of 30 member enterprises), Bien Dong 
Marine Product Corporation (Bien Dong Corporation consisting of 12 member 
enterprises) and Ha Long Fisheries Corporation (Ha Long Corporation consisting of 5 
member enterprises) established in 1995.  
1.1. The rationale of Vietnamese corporation 
In common understandings, a corporation is a business organisation, recognised and 
created by law, which allows people to associate together for a business purpose under a 
common name. A corporation is known as a joint-stock company jointly owned by 
different persons who receive shares of stocks in exchange for an investment of money in 
the venture and are limited liabilities. Corporation is corporate ownership and owned 
through shares held by private individuals. Those share are traded in organised markets, 
for example, exchange market. A common corporation has several features. Stockholders 
can sell all of their shares to new investors without disruption of business operations. 
Corporation exists independently of its owners. Corporation is recognised as a legal 
person with the same rights that individuals have including the rights to buy and sale 
property and to enter into contracts (Brealey and Mayers, 2003).  
The State-Owned Enterprise Law of Vietnam defines “a corporation is established and 
operating on the basis of the association of many member units having close relations of 
interests of business, technology, supplies, consumption, information, training and 
research, marketing, and operating in one or a number of main and special sectors, and 
with the aims to strengthen competitiveness of member units and implement the socio-
economic development strategies in each period of time”.  
A Vietnamese corporation differs in ownership, structural organisation and business 
concentration from a common corporation. The formation of corporation in Vietnam has 
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been carried out mainly by the way of grouping SOEs, concentrating resources, and 
promoting cumulation. The formation of corporation has been considered to be an initial 
stage of corporatisation. Functioning characteristics of a Vietnamese corporation are 
managing member enterprises and improving SOE efficiency while a common 
corporation is seeking for profits. A Vietnamese corporation is characterised by its sole 
state ownership and without corporate ownership, a significant factor to identify a 
common corporation. The ambiguous ownership issue has affected the performance of the 
corporation as a whole and level of competitiveness. In term of finance, there are weak 
financial linkages between member enterprises themselves and with corporation while in 
a common corporation financial mechanism is dependent between members and 
corporation that is acting as a “parent company”. Vietnamese corporations are operating 
under the State-Owned Enterprise Law dealing with SOEs only while common 
corporations are usually operating under the Company Law. 
Vietnamese corporations were formed to reduce unlimited liability entities in the national 
economy and transferred them to fewer managed ones that limit partly the situation of 
unlimited responsibilities in term of financial deficits. The reduction of management costs 
through management form of corporations reflects the enforcement of SOE reform policy. 
Vietnamese corporation is also regarded as an instrument to collect revenues for the 
national budget but this is not always explicitly. Hence, it is more likely to be an 
administrative organisation designed to manage SOEs with pure state ownership than a 
common corporation with profit-seeking purpose and multi-owners.  
1.2. General organisational structure of a fisheries corporation. 
Board of Directors comprises chairman, two or three vice-chairman, and five to seven 
regular members. The Board of Directors is the representative of the government as the 
owner of the corporation. Board of Managing Directors comprises one Chief Executive 
Officer (also known as General Director) and three to five Deputy Chief Executive 
Officers. Board of Managing Directors is responsible for corporation’s operations. 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer are appointed by Minister of Fisheries under the 
authorisation of the Prime Minister. 
Supervisory Board is responsible for supervising the Board of Managing Directors’ 
activities complying with the Articles of the corporation and guidance from the Board of 
Directors. Supervisory Board is acting independently from Board of Managing Directors 
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and under direct instructions of the Board of Directors. The Supervisory Board comprises 
several members and they can be regular members of the Board of Directors. Members of 
the Board of Directors, Supervisory Board are approved by the Ministry of Fisheries 
under the authorisation of central government. 
Head office of the corporation is composed of a number of departments. The 
Administration is responsible for any administrative activities from clerical work, 
receptions, and secretaries to office equipment of the corporation, securities... 
Department of Planning and Investment is dealing with planning and investment 
activities of the corporation. It has Division of Planning and Division of Investment. 
Department of Finance and Accounting is responsible for financial and accounting 
activities of the corporation including financial performance and capital source 
management. The Department is divided into four divisions: Division of Internal 
Auditing, Division of Financial Investment and Management, Division of Project Capital 
Management and Division of Accounting. Department of Personnel and Training is 
taking care of personnel and training matters. The Department comprises Division of 
Personnel, Division of Training, and Division of Labour and Wage. Department of Sales 
and Marketing comprises some divisions of marketing, service after sales, external co-
operation making contacts with governmental authorities, international organisations and 
customer relationships. Department of Law and Regulations involves in any matters 
concerning laws and regulations. It is divided into divisions: Division of Economic 
Contracts and Division of Consultation. 
Factories are directly producing fisheries products. A factory can be organised in several 
ways but mainly including production and administration. There are several workshops 
depending on product categories such as fish, shrimp or squid, dried, fresh or frozen. 
Factories only produce fisheries products. Sales, technology, labour and management, 
losses and profits… will be taken care by the corporation head office. Factories are 
dependent of the corporation in term of accounting principles (see Appendix II for 
corporation organisation chart).  
Under the control of the corporation there are member enterprises independent of 
corporation in term of accounting principles. The number of member enterprises in each 
corporation varies depending on the corporations and not less than the minimum number 
of five members. 
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1.3. Current state of performance and restructuring 
Since being established, corporations have created new corporate governance and 
released considerably administration work concerning SOEs from the Ministry of 
Fisheries. Corporation reduced intermediate management agencies of the Ministry and 
diminished bureaucrats in SOE business activities as well. It also created a clearer 
responsible regime relating to SOE operations. Corporations become administratively 
economic entities managing member enterprises’ production and business activities, 
technology, labour and personnel, accounting and financial performance in accordance 
with current regulations. This management regime is for the purpose of state capital 
preservation and raising, expansion of production and business, increases of export 
earning and payment to national budget, creation of job opportunities, and improvement 
of worker’s living standards.  
Corporations have been initially successful in drawing out annual and long-term 
development strategies as well as production and business plans. This is aiming at 
integrating member enterprises’ development into the overall movement of the 
corporation. Fisheries corporations have initially invested in technology to enhance 
productivity enabling the production of high quality and value-added products. They have 
been also arranging member enterprises’ production and business based on the overall 
economic development programmes of the Fisheries sector. 
Despite some initial achievements, corporations still have problems of organisational 
structure, operations, and efficiency. Relationships between members and corporation are 
administratively combination. Corporations have been formed mainly by grouping up 
SOEs in order to fulfil the required minimum number of member enterprises, five in the 
case of fisheries corporations such as Ha Long Corporation, but not on the basis of 
demands for collusion or mutual technological and financial supports. The majority of 
member enterprises before joining together forming corporations were independent 
accounting and they still make decisions of their equities. For this reason, the corporation 
has not yet been a unified economic organisation and failed to integrate operations of 
member enterprises into real power of a corporation. The relationships between member 
enterprises were not based on the ownership, duties and interests of member enterprises. 
Furthermore, corporation management mechanism, especially finance and personnel, 
could not solve the problem of disjointedly operating situations of member enterprises. 
Recent operations of three fisheries corporations have showed that there was no capital 
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concentration and competitiveness creation. These relationships are, therefore, only 
administrative combination and the link between corporation and member enterprises is 
weak.  
The relationship between member enterprises has not had any remarkable improvements. 
Many years of independent operations of enterprises re-registering according to the 
Decree 338/HDBT and corporation’s inability of wholly organising member enterprises 
as specified in the standard pattern cause overlaps in organisation and limited economic 
powers of a large business organisation. Several enterprises had been operating 
efficiently before entering the corporation. They now have to face some difficulties 
because of being bound within the boundary of the corporation. Furthermore, in a 
corporation there are some enterprises having different names and the same business 
activities but operating in the same markets so that competition between them is not 
avoidable especially in export. 
Financial performance of fisheries corporations was relatively poor. Revenues and profits 
were decreasing. Many member enterprises were still making loss. SEAPRODEX 
Vietnam Corporation, one of the largest corporations of the Ministry of Fisheries, is 
chiefly operating in fisheries export and partly in shipbuilding, repairing services and 
fishery seed production (accounting for 10% of total revenues). In comparison to 1999, 
total gross revenues increased 29.5% in 2000 but decreased 13.4% in 2001. In the year 
2000, 7 of 24 member enterprises (29% of total) had gross revenues less than that of 1999 
and 11 of 24 member enterprises (46% of total) had export and trade earnings less than 
that of 1999 (see Appendix III for detail).  
Regarding fisheries export, in 1999, the European Union decided to upgrade Vietnam 
into the List for export of fisheries products with 40 fisheries processing enterprises. 
Among those, there was no centrally affiliated fisheries SOE. In 2000, the whole 
Fisheries sector earned totally 1.4 billion USD from export but fisheries SOEs accounted 
for only small proportion of 16% and 1.76 billion USD and 10% in 2001 relatively. In 
1999, a private Kim Anh Company alone in six months earned 60 million USD from 
export while in SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation only earned 160 million USD (90% 
of whole fisheries SOE’s export earning). Compared to that of 1999, corporation’s export 
and trade earnings increased 54% in 2000 but decreased 8% in 2001 while annual export 
earning of the whole fisheries sector kept going up sharply by 19%. This state of affairs 
revealed that technology of corporation member enterprises was much lower than that of 
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private enterprises as export of fishery products usually requires expensive and modern 
production equipment. Fisheries SOEs were, therefore, loosing the leading role and 
probably state resources are no longer properly invested. 
Of Bien Dong Marine Fisheries Corporation, the percentage of enterprises making loss 
among its members was 36% and that of profitable enterprises was 45% but total 
accumulated loss was 4.37 times higher than incomes at corporation level (1999). In 
2000, the corporation paid to the national budget with 5% increase compared to that in 
1999, but income tax payment reduced 20% and accounted only for 0.3% of total 
payment to national budget. Income tax payment is an important indicator reflecting the 
profitability and efficiency of an enterprise.  
SOEs under corporations have been poorly performing and the current management 
mechanism of corporation probably made obstacles to the operating efficiency of some 
SOEs. There is a need for a more effective management scheme to keep SOEs viable. 
Restructuring measures will possibly make corporation more commercialised and transfer 
members to joint-stock or state-owned limited liability companies. This is a necessary 
intermediate step to the entire reform of fisheries SOEs. 
SEPRODEX Vietnam Corporation had 31% of member enterprises being in loss-making 
and total accumulated losses were 3 times larger than total incomes as the end of 1999. 
This numbers were 25% and 5.2 times in 2000, 25% and 6.2 times in 2001 relatively. 
There were 36% of Bien Dong Corporation’s total members in loss-making situation and 
total accumulated losses were 1.75 times larger than total incomes (in 1999). Ha Long 
Corporation was the worst: 43% of total members in loss-making, accumulated losses 
35.73 times larger than incomes (in 1999). 
Liabilities are much larger than the receivables: SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation: 
1.59 times (1999) and 1.7 times (2000 and 2001), Bien Dong Corporation: 1.75 times 
(1999), and Ha Long Corporation: 3.33 times (1999). These numbers revealed the fact 
that corporations were appropriating capitals of others (inter-enterprise liabilities) to do 
business and did not have their own financial potential. 
Business capital was much lower than minimum required level of 500 billion VND: Bien 
Dong Corporation: 304 billion VND, SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation: 284 billion 
VND, and Ha Long Corporation: 25 billion VND (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Some financial performance indicators of fisheries corporations (in 1999) 




Ha Long  
Corporation 
Number of member enterprises 12 30 5 
Business capital (billion VND) 304 284 25 
Loss-making enterprises (%) 36 31 42.8 
Profitable enterprises (%) 45 62 53 
Accumulated loss/income (times) 4.37 3.0 35.73 
Source:  Pham Quang Huan, 2001 
Another problem is overlapped authorities and responsibilities between the Board of 
Directors and Chief Executive Officer. The executive function of Chief Executive Officer 
and management function of the Board of Directors have not yet clarified and regulated. 
This caused many difficulties for both Chief Executive Officer and Board of Directors. 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer are appointed by the same authority and 
simultaneously authorised to receive state capital allocation for the corporation so that it 
is difficult to define clearly the legal responsibilities and authorities of these titles. 
Moreover, Chairman has not yet specified responsibilities and authorities of Board of 
Directors members. Consequently, there was encroachment with Chief Executive 
Officer’s authorities. Many decisions of the Board of Directors were not practical and 
timely causing losses of business opportunities of the corporation and further, of member 
enterprises (Pham Quang Huan, 2001).  
Corporations do not have financial potentials. The total amount of capitals is the sum of 
all member enterprises’ capitals. Corporations are incapable of integrating and co-
ordinating capital flows within itself to improve technology, expand business activities 
and markets, to enhance productivity or to support member enterprises in difficult 
situations. Fisheries corporation’s operations in recent years showed that their formation 
has not created capital accumulations, strong competitiveness and has been only simple 
administrative combination of member enterprises. Close finance, technology and market 
relationships among member enterprises have not yet created. Many member enterprises 
re-registered in accordance with the Decree No. 338/HDBT enacted before the formation 
of corporation have been still making their own decisions on enterprise’s capitals and 
incomes except regulated amounts subtracted for depreciation and some general funds of 
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the corporation. Meanwhile, the corporation could not support member enterprises due to 
lack of financial resources. 
Nominally, the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer are both on behalf of the 
corporation to receive the state capital allocation and re-distribute this capital to its 
member enterprises. This procedure is meaningless regarding state capital management in 
corporation since, in practice, capital allocation is exactly the amount of capitals that have 
been being owned and utilised by member enterprises before. The total capital of the 
corporation is simply the sum of capitals already owned by member enterprises.  
Member enterprises can be dependent and independent of the corporation in term of 
accounting principles. The corporation can control over operations of those depending on 
corporation. With those independent of corporation, it is very difficult to intervene into 
their economic decision-making. In this context, the corporation is really facing 
difficulties to control of the capitals as regulated by the State-Owned Enterprise Law. 
Additionally, state capital allocated to the corporation comprises total assets still in 
business and “dead” capitals not yet liquidated due to lack of regulations. Consequently, 
total assets are very high but real values in business are not as high. 
Corporation is only administratively carrying out the function of receiving annually 
supplementary capitals allocated by the Ministry of Finance to its member enterprises. It 
does not have full controls to co-ordinate these capital sources in order to create the 
financial powers and supports to member enterprises especially when difficulties arise. 
The corporation does not fully act as a common corporation with the pattern of parent 
company and financially dependent members. Therefore, corporation is only a 
centralisation process to eliminate the “exceed freedoms” of SOE autonomy and become 
an intermediate, on behalf of the state, to invest in member enterprises. This is 
administrative characteristics rather than economic activity. 
Personnel of corporation are not sufficiently competent. The organisational structure is 
not reasonable and bureaucrats still exist. Hence, activities of co-ordinating operations of 
member enterprises aiming at expanding markets and applying modern technology are 
not efficiently carried out.  
The objectives being set while establishing corporations, therefore, have not been 
obtained due to weak administration and inefficient economic performance of 
corporations in the Fisheries sector. 
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1.4. Restructuring of corporations 
In recent years, SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation has been restructuring its member 
enterprises. Investment and Design Consult Company, a SOE operating in fisheries 
trading and services, was transferred to be under direct control of the Ministry of 
Fisheries. Its two member enterprises, Central Aquaculture Services Company and 
Fisheries Materials Factory (being renamed to Ha Long Fisheries Materials Company) 
were transferred to Ha Long Corporation. This corporation also received Bac Lieu 
Fisheries Processing and Export-Import Company belonging to Bac Lieu province (under 
SEAPRODEX Minh Hai) and Xuan Thuy Fisheries Export Processing Company (under 
SEAPRODEX Hanoi).  
Two local affiliated SOEs were transferred to Ha Long Corporation: Xuan Thuy Lieu 
Fisheries Processing Export-Import Company (belonged to Nam Dinh province) and Ha 
Long Food Production and Export-Import Company (formerly Poultry Factory belonging 
to Hai Phong province). 
2. Current state of fisheries SOEs  
In marine fishing, among seven SOEs acting in marine capture only three still involve in 
fishing operation but having been making loss. These enterprises have to cover operating 
cost and loss by earnings from import, export and trading activities. The other four 
enterprises are mostly operating in import, export, trading and services so that the task of 
being fishing SOEs is not fulfilled. In three years from 1998 to 2000, those enterprises 
fished 1,470 tons while marine-fishing production of the whole sector was 5.8 million 
tons. In recent years, these SOEs have been granted subsidised credits to build new 
offshore fishing vessels and upgrade current fishing vessels for more profitable fisheries. 
Generally, fishing SOEs at central and local affiliated levels have very low production 
volume accounting for only small proportion of 5% of the whole sector, low revenues. 
In aquaculture, three SOEs are operating but with extremely poor performance. For 
example, the main business generating profits of Material Supply and Export Aquaculture 
Shrimp Company is petroleum transportation and trading services completely different 
from main tasks assigned by the its administration. Thus, the purpose of these SOEs’s 
operations has not met. These SOEs have been seriously making loss for long time and 
could not contribute any supports to aquaculture. 
 55
In fishery processing, 20 SOEs are operating in processing and exporting fishery products 
and but only 9 of them have revenues mainly from fisheries processing. The rest are 
operating as fish reseller or collecting fishery products for export and domestic 
consumption. The fact that the fisheries SOEs have turned out to be low efficiency, lack 
of competitiveness and capital accumulation in the development of the market-oriented 
economy. For instance, a private Kim Anh Company in six months of 1999 earned 60 
million USD from fisheries export while all fisheries SOEs earned 180 million USD in 
the whole year. Fisheries SOEs have no longer dominated the export of fisheries 
products. The loss of the leading role in export of state corporations partly caused loosens 
relationships between member enterprises. 
2.1. Production performance 
2.1.1. Production of enterprises 
Most of fisheries SOEs have adapted to competitive mechanism of the market-oriented 
economy with clear development strategies. Fisheries SOEs have also made many 
attempts to stay in production and business creating employment and improvement of 
worker incomes. However, the production of fisheries SOEs was accounting for small 
proportions in terms of volume and value (Table 5). Although a majority of enterprises 
has solved the chronically loss-making and contributed to the national budget income the 
performance of these enterprises is still poor.  
Table 5: The production of fisheries SOEs in 5 years (1996 - 2000) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Production volume (ton) 59,818 50,825 66,968 94,262 72,253 
Proportion of whole sector (%) 3.51 2.92 3.75 4.69 3.36 
Production value (fixed price in 
1994, million VND) 361,714 362,915 424,559 554,740 500,986 
Proportion of whole sector (%) 2.35 2.22 2.50 3.03 2.48 
Source: Pham Quang Huan, 2001 
Technology of fisheries SOEs is stagnating with outdated equipment particularly when 
compared to that of private sector enterprises even though they have financially invested 
for upgrading technology and equipment enabling the production of value added and 
higher quality products. It is obviously that there is a need for more investment to 
enhance the productivity and expand production of fisheries SOEs.  
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2.1.2. Equipment and technology 
Since the beginning of the transition to market-oriented economy, fisheries SOEs have 
been restructuring their production for increasing the efficiency of utilising labour forces 
and production equipment. Shipbuilding enterprises have invested in workshops and 
repairing services. Fisheries Mechanics Company (under Bien Dong Corporation) 
imported high quality composite husk technology replacing wooden and steal one.  
Fishing enterprises were allowed to access subsidised credits for building new offshore 
fishing vessels. Additionally, old fishing vessels have been upgraded with stronger 
engines and more efficient fishing technology. In fisheries processing, a number of 
enterprises have invested in building new processing factories, upgrading processing and 
storing equipment for higher value products. 
2.1.3. Marketing 
In domestic markets, fisheries SOEs are producing products meeting increasing 
preferences and demands and but facing strong competition of non-state sector 
enterprises. Shipbuilding and repairing service enterprises have strong position in the 
market by professional experiences, high quality products and services creating high 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, they have small market shares compared to high demand 
and large market for shipbuilding of the fisheries sector.  In aquaculture, enterprises 
producing feed for fish and shrimp farming are initially making profits. Their rivals are 
private enterprises, joint-venture companies producing similar products with higher 
technology and lower cost, and some importers dominating a significant market share.  
In international markets, fisheries processing SOEs are still carrying on their exports of 
high quality products to many countries having strict sanitary and quality requirements. 
The largest import market is Japan (37.5%). China and ASEAN countries are the second 
important market (27.5%).  Followings are the United States (17.5%) and the European 
Union (8%). Fisheries SOEs are weak in term of competitiveness and small in term of 
export earning compared to private sector enterprises operating in the same business. 
2.2. Financial performance 
In 2000, gross revenues increased 32% compared to that of 1999 and slightly decreased 
in 2001. Of gross revenues, export earnings accounted for only 40%. Export earnings also 
decreased in 2001 probably because of some difficulties concerning sanitary standards 
that the whole Fisheries sector had to cope with and fisheries product price going down in 
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world import markets. While export turnovers of whole Fisheries sector still keeps going 
up considerably, fisheries SOEs cannot make any forward movement in export earnings. 
At the same time, more state capital was annually invested in fisheries SOEs with 10% 
increase. On the other hand, fisheries SOEs made incomes following a declining trend. 
Income earned in 2000 was only 61% of that of 1999 and in 2001 income was 90% of 
that of 2000. Income was 27% of accumulated loss on average (income/accumulated loss: 
39.7% in 1999, 27.1% in 2000 and 19.5% in 2001). Limited state capital allotment and 
high interest bank loans could contribute as one of reasons for low profitability of 
fisheries SOEs (see Appendix III for detail).  
3. Restructuring and the reform of fisheries SOEs 
3.1.  Contracting out and selling SOEs  
The Ministry of Fisheries issued decision to contract out Kien Giang Fisheries Services 
Company with employees of the company. The state capital in this SOE is 0.79 billion 
VND. At the time being corporate evaluation is still in progress. It was the first fisheries 
SOE being contracted out under the Decree 103/ND-CP defining detailed regulations on 
contracting out, selling, leasing and buying out SOE. Contracting out was regarded as the 
most suitable reform option for this small capitalisation SOE in term of cost, efficiency, 
and social benefits for employees. However, detailed provisions of the contract are still 
being negotiated between employees and the owner representative. 
3.2.  Merging, dissolving and liquidating SOEs  
Fish Powder Company with state capital of 0.379 billion VND was merged with Mien 
Trung Seafood Processing and Trade Company increasing its state capitalisation to 
33.539 billion VND. These enterprises are members of SEAPRODEX Vietnam 
Corporation and independent accounting. The aim of merging is to remove too small 
capitalisation SOEs. 
3.3.  Establishing, re-registering and renaming SOEs  
Bien Dong Marine Fishing Factory was established as a new SOE with state capital of 
7.88 billion VND and registered as a member of Bien Dong Corporation. The enterprise 
is public-utility SOE with the task of fishing and providing fishing related services. 
Production and Technology Services Company with state capital of 1.2 billion VND was 
also a new public-utility SOE established under the Research Institute of Aquaculture 
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No.2. This SOE is providing research and development activities, technical services for 
aquaculture in the Southern Vietnam.  
Four SOEs were re-registered. Seafood Product Import Export Company No. 5 
(SEAPRIEXCO No. 5) 8.59 billion VND capitalised was re-registered under 
SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation as an accounting independent member.  Fisheries 
Mechanics Company (30.164 billion VND), Phu My Factory (2.375 billion VND) and 
Marine Equipment Company (3.4 billion VND), formerly dependent members, were re-
registered to be independent accounting members of Bien Dong Corporation. 
Bien Dong Marine Fishing Factory, formerly a public-utility SOE, was renamed to Bien 
Dong Marine Fishing Company and changed to profit-making SOE. This SOE is a 
member enterprise of Bien Dong Corporation. Central Fisheries Company, formerly an 
enterprise registered under ministerial control, was renamed to Fisheries and Services 
Company under SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation. Information and Advertisement 
Company was renamed to Information, Trading Services and Advertisement Company 
under SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation. 
3.4.  Equitisation of SOEs 
As the end of 31 March 2002, 9 SOEs were equitised (Table 6). All of those SOEs were 
formerly member enterprises of SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation. Total state capital 
before being equitised was 111.949 billion VND. There were three SOEs less than 5 
billion VND capitalised, five over 10 billion VND capitalised, and only one under 1 
billion VND capitalised.  Regarding accounting principles, among these enterprises there 
were seven SOEs independent of and the other two SOEs dependent on SEAPRODEX 
Vietnam Corporation. Total labour forces in these SOEs were 4,797 employees 
(Appendix IV).  
After equitisation, the state equity shares were 47.311 billion VND accounting for 28% of 
total equities of those equitised companies. The state does not hold the majority of shares 
in equitised companies (20-25%) except Fisheries Construction Join-Stock Company 
(75%). Net, Packages and Fisheries Materials Company, a Bien Dong Corporation 
member, just finished corporate evaluation with the value of 4.322 billion VND and still 
pending for next steps of equitisation procedure. All shares issued are common shares as 
fisheries is not a “strategic” sector that the government will have to control over the 
management of equitised companies by holding majority of common shares, special or 
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“golden” shares. SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation as representative of the owner of 
state capital in equitised companies, appointed its staff to the board of directors, attending 
shareholder annual meeting. 
Table 6: Fisheries SOEs being equitised as the end of March 2002 (in billion VND) 






Ha Long Canned Food Stock Corporation 12.603 1,016 27.50 10.278 
SEAFREECO 3.624 500 12.00 2.400 
SEAPRODEX Construction Factory 0.994 350 3.131 0.783 
Seafood Product Import Export Company No. 4 12319 444 15.00 3.750 
Fresh Seafood Processing and Export – Import Company 1.085 100 3.00 0.600 
Seafood Special Product Import - Export Company 53.806 1,371 68.00 17.00 
SEAPRODEX Minh Hai 10.756 250 15.00 3.750 
New Product Processing Factory 14.895 516 20.00 5.000 
Mien Trung Construction and Services Company 1.867 250 5.00 3.750 
Total 111.949 4,797 168.631 47.311 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2002 
Of these equitised companies, Ha Long Canned Food Stock Corporation (Ha Long 
CANFOCO) and Seafood Product Import Export Company No. 4 (SEAPRIEXCO No.4) 
are listed on the stock exchange. The shares of these joint-stock companies are attractive 
to both domestic and foreign investors by dividends and potential business future.  
Ha Long CANFOCO was the first fishery-processing factory of the North founded in 
1957 with the assistance of former Soviet Union. Ha Long CANFOCO was equitised in 
April 1999 with equity of 27.5 billion VND of which the government owned 37%. After 
annual shareholder meeting in June 2001, the shareholder equity was raised to 35 billion 
VND, of which the state held 30.65%, Vietnamese shareholders held 43.78%, and foreign 
shareholders held 25.57%. The company was equitised by raising equity and selling state 
equity shares to employees, foreign and other Vietnamese investors. Employees were 
allowed to purchase company shares with subsidised prices. Employees were also given 
with 10% of the company equity share from the state but they are only able to benefit 
from dividends generated from this part of shares. The real owner of this 10% is still the 
state.  Employees did not have the right to sale or enter these shares into contracts. 
Additionally, they could purchase on credits shares equivalent to 15% of total equity but 
 60
they have to pay all within two years. Therefore, employees could hold 25% of total 
company equity shares and actually owned 15%. The involvement of foreign 
shareholders was regarded as a measure to absorb foreign direct investment into the 
national economy particularly in the Fisheries sector known as lowest foreign direct 
investment.  
Since being equitised, company’s profitability has been improved considerably. The 
annual gross revenues annually increased by 2 folds in the first 3 years, 3 quarters of 
1999: 42.8 billion VND, 2000: 88.1 billion VND, 2001: 181.6 billion VND and 
decreased in 2002 to 111.5 billion VND but incomes keep increasing. Revenues from 
domestic market have accounted for large parts and but dropped down: 92% in 1999, 
81% in 2000, and 42% in 2001. Ha Long CANFOCO ranks the third for revenues among 
canned food production companies but the first for production capacity and volume. Net 
incomes have been annually rising 31.3% on average. Consequently, financial ratios 
measuring company’s profitability and efficiency have annually increased: return on 
equity: 18%, return on assets: 20%, earnings per share: 20%, internal growth rate: 110%, 
asset turnover: 45%, and dividend: 11%. Shareholder equity is annually going up by 10% 
on average. It is obviously that the state equity in this company is being efficiently 
invested (Appendix III). 
SEAPRIEXCO No. 4, formerly Frozen Fisheries Factory No. 4 and in 1995, was renamed 
to Frozen Fisheries Processing and Import–Export Company under SEAPRODEX 
Vietnam Corporation. The main business of the company is processing and exporting 
fisheries products. On 11 January 2001, this company was equitised with equity of 15 
billion VND, of which the state held 25%, employees owned 31.55%, other Vietnamese 
shareholders owned 21.1%, foreign shareholders owned 20% and treasury stock was 
2.35%. This SOE was also equitised by raising equity and selling state equity shares to 
employees, Vietnamese and foreign investors in the same manner as what have been done 
with Ha Long CANFOCO. It was listed on the stock market in September 2002 as a 
result of efficient post-equitisation performance. Compared to pre-equitisation, revenues 
have decreased considerably but net profits have sharply increased. Net income of 2001 
was 31% higher than that of 2000 and that of 2002 was 119% higher than that of 2001. 
As a consequence, profitability and operating efficiency of the company has been being 
improved greatly after being equitised (Appendix III).  
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Being equitised and listed on the stock market have strengthened the position of the 
company in the market with more involvement of private capitals known to be very high 
potential. The importance is that the state capitals investing in joint-stock companies have 
been generating higher returns in comparison to former SOE financial performances. At 
the same time, the national budget no longer has to bear losses and subsidies and the state 
can withdraw a large mount of capitals for other investments solving problems of limited 
capitals elsewhere. 
4. SOE reform activities of state institutions  
4.1.  Board of Enterprise Renewal and Development of the Ministry of Fisheries 
The Board of Enterprise Renewal and Development was founded as an enforcement of 
SOE reform policies at ministerial level. The Board comprises professional experts from 
certain department of the Ministry such as Department of Finance and Accounting, 
Department of Personnel and Labour Organisation, Department of Plan and Investment. 
Under the authorisation of the Minister, this Board is responsible for SOE reform 
activities under controls of the Ministry of Fisheries. These activities include planning, 
instructing SOEs to prepare reform modalities, making proposal for changes of 
regulations concerned if necessary.  
4.2.  Support to Industrial Restructuring and Enterprise Development  
Support to Industrial Restructuring and Enterprise Development (SIRED) is a component 
of Fisheries Sector Programme Support funded by Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA). SIRED is aiming at supporting fisheries enterprises particularly 
SOEs through the Ministry of Fisheries of Vietnam. The main objective of SIRED is 
support to strengthening management capacity of the Ministry of Fisheries hence the 
Ministry shall be able to consult and support equitisation and restructuring of fisheries 
SOEs. It helps to improve the performance of fisheries SOEs in the market-oriented 
economy. 
In recent years, SIRED has carried out many support activities to the Ministry and 
fisheries SOEs. In co-operation with Board of Enterprise Renewal and Development of 
the Ministry of Fisheries, SIRED organised conferences, workshops on equitisation and 
enterprise restructuring such as searching for more reasonable pattern of fisheries 
corporations or implementation of privatising management of SOEs. SIRED also 
supports many fisheries SOEs to accelerate the equitisation process, for example, An 
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Giang Fisheries Import and Export Joint-stock Company or Seafood Special Product 
Import - Export Company. Generally, SIRED is playing a significant support role in the 
reform of fisheries SOEs. 
5. Review of the SOE reform in the Fisheries sector 
In the early of 1980s, the Fisheries sector of Vietnam had made milestones to find new 
economic mechanism to overcome the difficult situation of long-time loss-making, 
stagnating, and low worker’s incomes. The Fisheries sector was early granted autonomy 
with free usage of export earnings to import materials and reinvest in renewal of 
production factors. This resulted in the foundation of many processing factories, ship-
repairing services, fishing vessels and fish landing sites. Fisheries SOEs led small-scale 
fisheries to the rapid development and successfully carried out their leading role in the 
initial stage of the transition to market-oriented economy. In the period of 1980 – 1986, 
total fisheries production and export earning increased though the state investment 
reduced to 41.5% and state financial allotment for fisheries SOEs was only 20% - 30% of 
the previous five-year plan. In 1980, total fisheries production was 558.6 thousand tons 
and export earning was 11.2 million USD. In 1985, these figures were raised to 808 
thousand tons and 100 million USD relatively. These successes and experiences of the 
Fisheries sector had been considered as a crucial element of practical background on 
which the government decided to abandon the centrally planed economy and transfer to 
the market-oriented economy. 
Since the renovation process of Doi Moi in 1986, business and production activities of 
fisheries SOEs had been changing very much. Fisheries SOEs were gradually loosing the 
leading role and poorly performing. The fisheries SOE role of “red middleman” 
previously playing a very active role in promoting small-scale fisheries has been 
transferred to the private sector operating widely and more efficiently. The “private 
middleman” became main distributing force between local areas for supplying fisheries 
materials to processing factories, aquaculture services and marine fishery (Pham Quang 
Huan, 2001). 
In recent years, fisheries SOEs have been operating in loss-making and low efficiency. 
This situation called for a complete reform of fisheries SOE system to make them viable 
and release the government from the financial burden of bearing losses and subsidies. It 
also makes more private capitals involve in SOEs to solve problems of inefficient 
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management and limited state capital. The government should only focus on SOEs acting 
in some activities that are important to the common development of the Fisheries sectors 
and that private sectors cannot or do not want to invest in. These include aquaculture 
developments (importing, researching, producing and promoting breeds of high value fish 
species; fish veterinary drugs; disease preventing, technical consults and services), 
marine fishing promotions (offshore fishing, landing site systems, and logistic services in 
the sea), and modern processing technology. For those not in need of pure state 
ownership, it is necessary to equitise them to transform them to joint-stock companies. 
Additionally, small-scale, chronic loss- making SOEs must be bankrupted or liquidated. 
Equitisation transfers SOEs operating under the State-Owned Enterprise Law with state 
subsidies, preferential privileges and exceptional rights to joint-stock companies 
operating under the Company Law without subsidies and completely exposed to free 
competition. This, as well, brings new management scheme to these enterprises to make 
them more profit-oriented and hence improves their efficiency. Previously, directors of 
fisheries SOEs were appointed by the corporation or relevant authority. The appointment 
was not always based on managerial skills of these directors but political intervention at 
some certain levels. The fact that many fisheries SOE managers did not have qualification 
in business administration they usually came from technical areas such as fishing 
technology, aquaculture or fisheries mechanics. If managers’ capacity is not appropriate 
to commercial management requirements, the SOE will not probably be profitable. After 
being transformed into joint-stock company, shareholders in the annual meeting elect a 
more responsible board of directors that their duties and interests are more involved in 
each other. This mechanism assures that profit maximisation is the most concerned 
purpose of company operations and that business and development of the company is 
economically decided by its real owners. Equitisation also released the national budget 
from bearing the burden of losses and subsidies resulted from increasing accumulated 
losses and decreasing profits of fisheries SOEs. Re-evaluation of state assets in fisheries 
SOEs showed that formerly state assets were under evaluated causing unexpectedly low 
re-investment in production expansion and development. In addition, the state collected a 
large amount of equity from selling shares and dividends, over 64 billion VND in case of 
equitising 9 fisheries SOEs, for other investment demands. 
Employee’s living standards have been rising considerably by increases in salaries and 
dividends from company shares. Employees have become real owners of the company 
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creating strong incentives to enhance labour productivity, therefore, improving the 
efficiency of the company. Interestingly, more job opportunities were created instead of 
retrenched labours as an obvious consequence of privatisation process because of 
business expansions and more investment of post equitised companies. 
Equities of equitised companies were also increasing by 50% on average compared to 
that of pre-equitisation fisheries SOEs. The market values of equitised company stocks 
increased as a result of their profitability and high potential business. It has also attracted 
more private capital involvement in fisheries joint-stock companies, especially foreign 
investments. Taking as an example, foreign shareholders own 25.57% of total Ha Long 
CANFOCO equity and 20% of SEAPRIEXCO No. 4 equity. With only 9 equitised 
companies, an amount of private capitals 10% higher than total pre-equitisation state 
capital in SOEs was invested accounting for 72% of total equity of these companies. 
Nonetheless, the reform of fisheries SOEs is still facing some problems and issues. First 
of all, the reform progress was lagging behind the schedule. However, this problem 
happens not only in fisheries but all sectors of the national economy. There are some 
reasons for this relating to legal and institutional frameworks, perception of the 
equitisation of workers and managers of SOEs. In governmental institutions, civil 
servants are unwilling to give away any privileges of patronage enterprises. Some think 
that equitisation is out of socialist direction and the government is loosing controls of 
state assets. Incompetent managers of SOEs are afraid of equitisation. They are 
threatened by being removed from preferential privileges given by being SOE managers. 
Workers are also afraid of loosing their jobs particularly unskilful ones and redundant 
labours in the SOEs. The more important consequence of equitisation for employees is 
the loss of welfare benefits formerly provided by SOEs. In practice, it is difficult for them 
to find jobs that can give them similar level of incomes and social benefits.  In addition, 
regulations on post-equitisation retrenched labour treatments and on preferential 
conditions for purchasing shares are still not clear and not sufficient to provide them 
more incentives to actively participate in the reform process.  Hence it is necessary to 
complete legal framework and make concerned people take active parts in the SOE 
reform. 
State asset evaluation before equitisation taking place is a remarkable problem. In many 
cases, the evaluation of state assets in SOEs has postponed the equitisation and even 
cancelled it in some special circumstances. Auditing work is costly but incapable of 
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evaluating the corporate value in some circumstances. Hence it is essential to improve 
professional skills of auditors and related regulations. 
6. Development strategies 
There will be several SOEs essentially under full state ownership. These SOEs are acting 
in marine fishing including offshore fishing, provisions of logistics services in the sea and 
running fish landing sites (Cat Lo and Ha Long fish landing sites). These SOEs regardless 
profit-making or public-utility should be transferred to joint-stock companies owned by 
other SOEs or state-owned limited liability companies operating under the Company 
Law. Meanwhile, the government should invest more capitals in these SOEs to boost 
their business and production. These companies could also be allowed to issue bonds or 
special shares to raise equity for production expansion and technological enhancement. 
Other profit-making SOEs operating in processing and exporting fisheries products, 
trading and services should be equitised. Since Fisheries is not a “strategic” economic 
sector the government does not need to remain such large state ownership share enabling 
state to control over these equitised companies. After equitisation the state equity shares 
should play the role of supporting the development of these companies rather than 
controlling them. When the businesses are stable and profitable it is possible to give away 
state equity shares by selling it to private parties. 
Bankruptcy, liquidation, merging or other form of privatising management could be 
employed to fisheries SOEs that are small capitalisation (less than 1 billion VND), or 
long time loss-making such as Central Aquaculture Company, or for any reason they 
cannot be equitised. The aims are to delete small, loss-making SOEs in need of state 
subsidisation, to utilise state capital more efficiently, and to enhance values of SOEs. 
Some fisheries SOEs should be bankrupted because they are impossible to repay overdue 
debts but the legal provisions still not allow bankruptcies taking place. The Ministry of 
Fisheries should elaborate detailed action plans and support these SOEs particularly in 
corporate evaluation, deletion of debts from balance sheets, and retrenched labours. 
Defining guidelines and procedures for selecting SOEs to be restructured needs clarifying 
to get rid of any confusion and postponement. It is an immediate need to amend the 
Bankruptcy Law to enable SOE bankruptcy and regulation on retrenched labours and 
supports to employee’s purchase of joint-stock company shares.  
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Fisheries corporations are small capitalisation and operating with extremely low 
efficiency. It is necessary to commercialise these corporations. There is a need for 
applying the organisational pattern that current corporations become “parent companies” 
investing capitals in 100% state-owned limited liability or joint-stock companies. This 
pattern makes relationships between corporation and member enterprises clearer 
particularly corporation capital management and ensures autonomy of member 
enterprises. The introduction of commercial principles into corporation’s operation and 
management will help it to operate as other profit-making enterprises under Company 
Law. It promotes abandon of discrimination between SOEs and non-state sector 
enterprises as well. Ha Long Corporation and Bien Dong Corporation should be colluded 
due to their small capitalisation and the nature of business. 
Debts in SOEs are one of the most difficult and complicated issues in making SOEs 
viable. Accumulated losses and debts consist of bank loans, inter-enterprise and national 
budget debts. With debts from national budget, the state should be necessarily responsible 
for covering the remaining after SOEs attempts to repay. SOEs should also elaborate 
plans for repaying bank loans by all means available. For bank loans, if SOE is incapable 
of repaying it may negotiate with creditors about interest, due date, or debt-equity swaps. 
Otherwise it must be bankrupted to avoid any unnecessary subsidies. However, the state 
should be responsible for deleting debts from SOE balance sheets to make them viable 
and possible to be further reformed. 
The state should establish unemployment funds to finance retrenched labours. For those 
leaving voluntarily, compensations are crucial and unavoidable. For those not willing to 
quit, training for transferring them to other activities and unemployment allowance are 
very important. Another issue is the preferential right for employees to purchase shares of 
equitised companies. Because most employees are poor the government should consider 
that in addition to price subsidisation it is possible to give employees a certain percentage 
of state equity shares instead of only allowing them to benefit from dividends but not 
possessing these shares. It could bind them to a commitment not to sell these shares in a 




In the movement from centrally planned economy to market economy, each nation has 
selected different strategies for economic transition but the reform of SOEs becomes the 
most important. It has been undertaken to improve the performance and efficiency of 
SOEs, reduce public debts and fiscal burden of loss-making SOEs and free limited funds 
for financing other activities. It also solves the problem of limited state resources by 
mobilising more domestic resources for development. 
For over 15 years, Vietnam has been carrying out the reform of SOE system in almost all 
sectors of the economy. There were remarkable results such as the large reduction of SOE 
numbers, improvement of SOE performance, and more involvement of non-state sectors.  
Nevertheless, there are still certain issues concerning institutional and legal frameworks, 
macro-economic policies, broad-based consensus of equitisation concept among actors, 
and social effects of the reform. This created many obstacles to the general development 
of the national economy. Therefore, there is an immediate need for speeding up the 
reform process and extensively spreading out diversification of ownership among state 
sector. 
In the first period of the transition, the Fisheries sector gained initial successes in 
searching for new economic mechanism to overcome long time loss-making of SOEs. 
This created fast forward movement of the whole Fisheries sector. Fisheries SOEs lost 
their leading role when the country turned to the market-oriented economy development 
and turned out to be inefficient. In the attempts to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of SOEs, the Fisheries sector has been carrying out the reform of 
fisheries SOEs but not very intensively and extensively. However, the reform has had 
significant achievements in SOE productivity enhancement, technology upgrade, 
transformation of SOE to more commercialised forms. State corporations have been 
restructured but still have problems of organisational structure and in need of further 
adjustments particularly the introduction of corporatisation. Privatised companies were 
improved considerably in term of profitability, operating efficiency, outputs, and 
employment. In the cases of Ha Long CANFOCO and SEAPRIEXCO No. 4, financial 
analysis shows significant positive changes in their post-equitisation performance. This is 
also an evidence of the right direction movement of the reform process. 
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The reform of SOEs in the Fisheries sector needs implementing continuously and more 
intensively. This requires more active roles of the Ministry of Fisheries, SOE managers 
and employees, international donators in specifying detail plans, supporting the 
preparation of equitisation and equitised companies. In the next five years, SOEs should 
be transformed to operate under the Company Law. Public-utility SOEs should be 
invested with more state capital to support the development of the sector economics. 
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1. Appendix I: Important regulations relating to the reform of state-owned 
enterprises after economic renovation of Doi Moi in 1986 
 
Regulations Date Contents 
Cabinet order No. 217-HDBT Nov 24, 1987 Decision on comprehensive reform of 
state-owned enterprises. Includes reform 
of planning system, granting of 
autonomy, abolition of subsidies and the 
central planning system. 
Cabinet order No. 50- HDBT 
 
Mar 22, 1988 Promulgation of regulations on state-
owned industrial enterprises. 
Cabinet order No. 161- HDBT Oct 18, 1988 Promulgation of regulations on foreign 
currency control. 
Cabinet order No. 27- HDBT 
 
Mar 23, 1989 Promulgation of regulations on state-
owned enterprise union (replacing the 
regulations in 1978). 
Cabinet order No. 28- HDBT 
 
Mar 22, 1989 Promulgation of regulations on economic 
organisations and economic integration 
Decision No. 38-HDBT Apr 10, 1989 Promotion of economic co-operation in 
production, distribution and services 
Decision No. 176-HDBT 
 
Oct 9,1989 Readjustment of state-owned enterprises 
employment. 
Decision No. 218-CP Aug 18, 1989 Transition from the foreign currency 
control system to a central management 
fund in foreign currency. 
Cabinet order No. 64- HDBT 
 
Jun 10, 1989 Provisions on import and export activities 
and mergers with foreign enterprises  





Regulations Date Contents 
Instructions No. 315/CP Sep 1, 1990 Trial transfer to state-owned enterprises 
of the right to use capital 
Decision No. 195-HDBT 
 
Dec 2, 1989 Transfer to state-owned enterprises of the 
right to use state-owned enterprise assets 
and to conduct asset evaluation 
Instructions No. 138- CT 
 
Apr 25, 1991 Transfer to enterprises of the rights to 
maintain and increase state-owned 
enterprise assets 
Decision No. 332- HDBT Oct 23, 1991 Detailed provisions on the rights to 
maintain and increase state-owned 
enterprise assets. 
Decision No. 388- HDBT Oct 20, 1991 Regulations on establishment and 
dissolution of state-owned enterprises. 
Decision No. 378- HDBT 
 
Nov 16, 1991 Provisions on the working funds of state-
owned enterprises. 
Instructions No. 202-CT Oct 6, 1992 Pilot incorporation program 
Bankruptcy Law Dec 1993  
Decision No. 90-TTg Mar 7, 1994 Continuation of the readjustment of state-
owned enterprises and the establishment 
of General Corporations 
Decision No. 91-TTg Mar 7, 1994 Establishment of the General Corporation 
State-Owned Enterprise Law Apr 20, 1995  
Cabinet order No. 39-CP Jul 27, 1995 Promulgation of the Model Charter of 
General Corporations 
Cabinet order No. 28- CP May 3, 1996 Incorporation policy 
Cabinet order No. 59- CP 
 
Oct 3, 1996 Financial management and operating cost 






Regulations Date Contents 
Instruction No.20/1998/CT-TTg Apr 21, 1998 Speeding up restructuring and reforming 
state-owned enterprises 
Domestic Investment Law May 20, 1998  
Decree No.44/1998/ND-CP Jun 29, 1998 Transformation of state-owned 
enterprises into joint-stock companies 
Decree No 48/1998/ND-CP Jul 11, 1998 Securities and stock markets 
Company Law Jun 12, 1999  
Decision No. 145/1999/QD-TTg Jun 28, 1999 Regulation on selling shares to foreign 
investors 
Decree No 50/1999/ND-CP Jul 08, 1999 Regulating the organisation and operation 
of the Supporting Development Fund 
Decision No 177/1999/QD-TTg Aug 30, 1999 Regulating organisation and operation of 
the Fund for supporting state-owned 
enterprise restructuring and equitisation 
Decree No 103/1999/ND-CP Sep 10,1999 Regulating contracting out, selling, 
leasing and buying out state-owned 
enterprises 
Decree No 02/2000/ND-CP Feb 03, 2000 Regulating business registration 
Decree No 03/2000/ND-CP Feb 03, 2000 Instruction of implementation some 
certain articles of Enterprise Law 
Decision No. 55/2000/QD-TTg May 22, 2000 Authorities of selling, contracting out and 
leasing state-owned enterprises with state 
capital between 1-5 billion VND  
Decree No 73/2000/ND-CP Dec 06, 2000 Promulgation of Regulation on 




2. APPENDIX II:  Organisational Chart of a Fisheries Corporation  
 BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
BOARD OF MANAGING DIRECTOR 
SUPERVISORY BOARD 
Factories Dept. of Planning and Investment 
Dept. of Finance and Accounting 
Division of Planning  
Division of Investment  
Division of Internal Auditing 
Division of Financial 
Investment and Management 
Division of Project Capital 
Management  
Division of Accounting  
Dept. of Personnel and Training 
Administration 
Division of Personell 
Division of Labour and Wage  
Division of Training 
Dept. of Law and Regulations 
Division of External Cooperation 
Dept. of Sales and Marketing  
Division of Marketing 
Division of Services 
Division of Economic Contracts 
Division of Consultation 
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3. Appendix III:  Balance sheets and income statements 
3.1. Financial summary report of SEAPRODEX Vietnam Corporation, 1999-2001 
 
December, 31 1999 2000 2001
1. Total number of member enterprises 29  24  23  
Benefit utility       
Profitable (*) 18  16  16  
Cost recovery 2  2 1  
Loss-making                  9  6  6  
2. State capital (million VND)       
National budget allocation 140,649  125,825  12,616  
Other sources 258,952  255,574  29,594  
3. Labour (person) 8,095  8,498  8,571  
4. Business (million VND)    
Gross Revenue 4,064,039  5,262,119  4,555,283  
        Export earning (million USD) 113  174  160  
Pre-tax income 33,506  20,869  17,786  
Loss (accumulated)  100,001  107,594          109,482  
5. Payment to national budget (million VND) 512,708  472,908  400,049  
VAT 355, 501  321,727  301,332  
Income tax 9,273  9,883              7,659  
Export and import taxes 13,696  13,299  84,848  
Special tax 518  285                 423  
Expenses of state capital use 3,725  2,042              1,982  
6. Liabilities (million VND) 1,002,668  1,289,667  1,311,396  
Debts from national budget 68,667            93,563  30,781  
Debts from commercial banks 503,053          661,586  773,035  
7. Receivable  (million VND) 62,931  740,537  761,957  
    
* member enterprises are able to generate profits but accumulated loss was not taken into account 
    
Source:  Ministry of Finance, 2002 
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3.2. Financial summary report of fisheries SOEs, 1999 – 2001 
 
December 31, 1999 2000 2001 
1. Total number of SOEs (*) 53 51 56 
  Benefit utility 0 1 1 
Profitable (**) 38 40 44 
Cost recovery  2 2 1 
Loss-making 13 9 11 
2. State capital (million VND) 497,488 544,232 619,589 
National budget 220,079 263,358 334,165 
Other sources 277,409 280,874 285,424 
3. Labours (person) 11,996 12,432 13,013 
Still idle 300 250 150 
4. Business (million VND)    
Gross Revenue 5,228,389 6,910,739 6,734,312 
     Export earning (USD) 135,312,000 196,921,000 180,191,000 
Pre-tax income 37,703 23,091 20,750 
Loss (accumulated) 94,995 106,481 106,461 
5. Payment to national budget (million VND) 762,207 766,885 746,598 
VAT 474,148 422,174 399,181 
Income tax 9,746 11,659 8,345 
Export and import taxes 265,911 306,126 261,413 
Special tax 966 645 -169 
Expenses of state capital use 4,185 2,961 2,305 
6. Liabilities (million VND) 1,400,973 1,867,820 2,089,548 
Debt from national budget 90,914 129,214 65,834 
Debt from commercial banks 646,167 856,121 1,010,963 
7. Receivable (million VND) 796,472 994,815 1,193,057 
    
(*) Including enterprises’ accounting depending on Corporations 
(**) SOEs are able to generate profits but accumulated loss was not taken into account 
    





3.3. Balance sheet of Ha Long CANFOCO, 1999 - 2002 
 
December, 31 2002 2001 2000 1999*
(In Vietnamese Dong – VND)  
Assets  
Current  
Cash 3,256,708,055 2,679,600,057 1,560,748,987 775,587,659
Receivable 26,262,846,060 23,598,612,417 20,791,175,466 21,803,429,699
Inventories 23,563,894,046      18,091,623,679 16,648,632,803 13,990,646,204
Other liquid assets  297,843,994 224,782,029 253,210,053
Total Current Assets   53,217,741,898 44,667,680,147 39,225,375,285 36,822,873,615
Investment and Other Assets  
Fix assets 22,807,084,082 21,157,145,863 19,408,113,474 20,726,778,447
Long-term financial investment  498,064,923 498,064,923 498,064,923
Other assets 4,408,359,356 36,629,233 11,677,000 48,247,406
Total Fix Assets       27,215,443,438 21,691,840,019 19,917,855,397 21,273,090,776
 80,433,185,336 66,359,520,166 59,143,230,682 58,095,964,391
  




Short term debt 24,488,142,302 14,949,325,146 13,306,222,954 13,655,313,666
Others  134,286,910 93,778,412 91,446,176
Long term debt 11,500,003,840 12,000,989,025 11,981,390,652 12,730,104,498
Liability 36,276,542,420 27,084,601,081 25,381,392,018 26,476,864,340
Total shareholders' equity      44,156,642,916 39,274,919,085 33,761,838,664 31,619,100,051
      80,433,185,336 66,359,520,166 59,143,230,682 58,095,964,391
*data of three last quarters  
  
Source: Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange, 2003 
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3.4. Income Statements of Ha Long CANFOCO, 1999 – 2002 
 
December, 31 2002 2001 2000 1999*
Gross Revenue 111,428,759,094 181,635,528,116 88,182,583,191 42,846,119,389
Sales Return and Allowances 78,196,190 588,564,594 488,432,601 139,402,698
Operating Revenue 111,350,562,904 181,046,963,522 87,694,150,590 42,706,716,691
Cost of Good Sold 88,433,364,998 164,259,323,707 74,892,481,439 34,273,058,777
Gross Profits 22,917,197,906 16,787,639,815 12,801,669,151 8,433,657,914
Selling Expense 9,021,733,932 6,741,601,020 4,575,147,706 2,940,124,447
Administrative and General 
Expenses 
4,973,364,313 3,702,230,452 3,675,508,276 2,434,054,886
Operating Income 8,922,099,661 6,343,808,343 4,551,013,169 3,059,478,581
Interest Income 318,708,498 2,944,955,021 812,026,521 671,550,000
Interest Expense 1,773,504,761 513,194,916 22,680,971 61,112,314
Other Incomes 162,615,416 1,699,579,445 226,098,388 8,981,900
Other Expenses 162,615,416 1,538,717,325 113,211,052 5,880,835
EBIT 7,629,919,325 8,936,430,568 5,453,246,055 3,673,017,332
Interests - - - -
EBT 7,629,919,325 8,936,430,568 5,453,246,055 3,673,017,332
Income Tax - 426,723,277 - -
Net Income 7,629,919,325 8,509,707,291 5,453,246,055 3,673,017,332
Net Income per Share 2,180 2,431 1,983 1,336
*data of three last quarters 
  
Source: Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange, 2003 
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3.5. Balance sheet of SEAPRIEXCO No. 4, 2001 - 2002 
 
December, 31 2002 2001




Short term securities 97,701,530 493,500,000
Receivable 28,416,047,146 17,104,490,738
Inventories 3,551,867,137 1,724,934,942
Other liquid assets 0 63,345,900
Total Current Assets 32,210,050,638 20,383,515,366
Investment and Other Assets 7,127,858,980 4,920,083,132
Fix assets 5,959,295,327 3,920,083,132
Other assets 1,168,563,653 1,000,000,000
Long-term financial investment 0 0
Total Fix Assets 39,337,909,618 25,303,598,498
 
 
Liabilities and Shareowners' Equity 
Current  
Short term debt 19,497,017,985 7,615,197,511
Others 0 352,376,691
Total current liabilities 19,497,017,985 7,967,574,202
Long term debt 0 0
Liability 19,497,017,985 7,967,574,202
Total shareholders' equity 18,843,844,357 17,336,042,296
38,340,862,342 25,303,616,498
 
Source: Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange, 2003 
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3.6. Income Statements of SEAPRIEXCO No. 4, 1998 - 2002 
 
December, 31 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
Gross revenues 85,288,199,315 43,183,724,468 123,144,766,924 84,834,211,924 69,304,512, 962
Sales Return and Allowances 793,082,184 467,385,275
Operating Revenues 84,495,117,131 42,716,339,193 123,144,766,847 84,834,211,924 69,008,971,891
Cost of goods sold 71,664,216,992 36,884,635,705 115,565,546,835 78,156,107,670 63,432,476,173
Gross Profits 12,830,900,139 5,831,703,488 7,579,220,012 6,678,104,254 5,576,495,718
Selling expenses 6,244,434,324 2,646,986,058 4,094,870,937 3,724,836,683 3,157,210,364
Administrative and General Expenses 1,532,608,702 959,844,120 1,186,025,039 1,229,170,381 1,415,161,354
Operating Income 5,053,857,113 2,224,873,310 2,298,324,036 1,724,097,190 1,004,124,000
Interest Income 348,354,393 5,565,200 50,278,606 750,481,163 517,834,267
Interest Expense 269,212,019 -
Other Income 1,357,758,999 105,585,737
Other Expense 1,370,793,901 -
EBIT 5,119,964,585 2,336,024,296 2,629,472,392 2,532,010,736 4,754,681,455
Interest  
EBT 5,119,964,585 2,336,024,296 2,629,472,392 2,532,010,736 4,754,681,455
Income Tax  841,431,166 785,905,836
Net Income 5,119,964,585 2,336,024,296 1,788,041,226 1,746,104,900 4,754,681,455
Net Income per Share 3,413 1,595
Source: Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange, 2003 
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4. APPENDIX IV: List of SOEs being equitised in period of 1999-2002 
 
 
























Ha Long Canned Food 
Company 
43 Lª Lai, Ng« QuyÒn 


















135B TrÇn B×nh Träng 


















299/23-25 Lý Th-êng 









Tourist and Trading Joint-











Company No. 4 
331 BÕn V©n §ån, Ward 


















Processing and Export 
– Import Company 
1004B ¢u C¬, Ward 19, 



















Product Import - 
Export Company 
213 Hoµ B×nh, Ward 
19, T©n B×nh 
district, HCMC 
Tel: 84(8) 9731581 - 
8606085  






Seafood Special Product 










SEAPRODEX Minh 16 Phan §×nh Phïng   Minh Hai Fisheries Joint-     
 86
Hai street, Cµ Mau city, 
Ca Mau province 
Tel: 84(780) 832090 - 
831527 
10.756 570 stock Company 15.000 14/01/2002 28/3/2002 3.750 
New Product 
Processing Factory 
1004A ¢u C¬, Ward 19, 
T©n B×nh district, 
HCMC 



















63-65 Hoµng V¨n Thô, 
Ph-íc Ninh, H¶i 
Ch©u,§µ N½ng city 
Tel: 84(511) 641022 
 
1.867 
 
250 
Vietnam Fisheries 
Construction Joint-stock 
Company 
 
5.000 
 
22/11/2001 
 
8/01/2002 
 
3.750 
 
